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This thesis treats four major themes of vital importance to contemporary politics
and strategy in the Caspian Sea region. In the first instance, it explores the growing geo-
strategic role of the littoral states. Secondly, it treats the Caspian littoral as an issue of the
strategic partnership between Turkey and the United States with due attention to the
interaction of domestic and external politics as is plainly visible in all considerations of
the Caspian littoral. In the third instance, this thesis analyzes the sources of political
instability in the Caspian Sea Basin seen through the lenses of Turkish and U.S. policies.
And finally, the thesis evaluates the effects of new developments on regional and global
political concerns.
This thesis demonstrates that Turkey and the United States have similar interests
in the region. But these allies' policies in the last decade could neither conclude the
construction of a main oil pipeline from Azerbaijan nor solve the inherent problems of
the littoral states. Furthermore, domestic and other international issues hinder the
implementation of their policies. Considering these new developments, Turkish and U.S.
policy makers must adopt a new outlook. Being stakeholders in these events requires
them to revise their policies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"Energy security" 1 entered the lexicon of world policy with the 1973 Arab oil
embargo and expanded to international importance with the 1979 crisis. A new era in
world politics and commerce emerged with the take over of the world oil markets by the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Embedded in the conflict in the
Middle East, the United States and other countries began shaping energy security
considerations at the same time. These considerations have profoundly complicated the
security dimensions of energy policies. Global resource consciousness and scarcity of
new oil resources had been the significant aspects of this new era. Another aspect was the
increasing use of oil as a political instrument; The Iranian oil crisis between 1951-53 was
an example. Oil became a more important element of world politics than it had been
before. For more than two decades energy security policies have been the crucial elements
of foreign policy decision making. Considering the increasing energy consumption with
world oil demand and dependence on foreign oil resources, nations began to feel that they
were no longer in control of their national destinies. In Henry Kissinger's words the
energy crisis of 1973 was, "a grave challenge to the political and economic structure of
the free world."2 Especially in the United States, policy makers eventually became more
sensitive to petroleum issues. According to one U.S. congressman,:
The ability of the United States to exercise its free will and to carry out its
responsibilities as leader of the free world could be jeopardized by an
excessive dependence on foreign oil imports.3
1 For most industrial countries, energy security means ensuring access to foreign oil supplies at
reasonable prices. For oil-producing countries, energy security means the physical protection and transport
of oil to market for a reasonable price. Both consumers and suppliers therefore concern themselves with
events that could jeopardize oil's physical security, its delivery and its price. Geoffrey Kemp, "The Persian
Gulf Remains the Strategic Prize," Survival (London), Vol. 40, No.4 (winter 1998/1999): 41.
2 C. Ebinger, The Critical Link (Washington, D.C.; Ballinger, 1982), quoted in Vito Stagliano,
Energy and National Security in the 21 s ' Century (Washington, D.C.; NDU Press, 1995), 127.
3 Senator Murkowski, (AK), Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Hearings on
Implications ofthe Middle Eastern Crisisfor Near-term and Mid-term Oil Supply, 101 st Congress, T sess.,
September 1990, quoted in Vito Stagliano, Energy and National Security, 127.
1
These expressions aptly emphasize the growing significance of energy and specifically oil
in the new century.
Although the security of oil has little economic meaning as a commodity easily
traded in a free environment, market disruptions of oil may have fundamental policy
crises on the world scale. Vito Stagliano describes the 1973 embargo as a crisis
threatening the national confidence of the United States unseen since the Great
Depression.4 Obviously weaker countries, which do not have the means the United States
has, can be affected more seriously from similar crises. Today OPEC remains as a
powerful organization. 5 Even though its effectiveness decreased, it still has the ability to
strongly influence the global market. Under these circumstances causes of contemporary
oil supply disruptions may vacilliate from embargoes to more complicated issues of
international relations. While other fuels remain important, petroleum dominates national
attention. Supply and pricing, crisis-stimulating events and the responses to them will
generate energy crises in the new century. Many powers are largely free from constraints
by the superpower rivalries, rush for natural resources and unpredictability heightens the
risk of regional instability. In the new environment a worldwide energy supply shortage
or destabilization of the energy-producing regions can effect political structures at home
and abroad. A sizable level of oil kept from markets may generate armed conflicts, and
terrorist activities may effect oil trade globally. A disruption in the world oil shipping
lanes at the choke points like straits or canals could result in a crisis. 6 Energy security
includes political concerns and important economic issues. Apart from singular causes
new energy problems might have roots in geopolitical situations.
4
Ibid., 128.
5 OPEC has always operated on an economic basis and did not cause the 1973 crisis directly, but
individual members and groups have always maintained the ability to use this organization for political
purposes.
6 Ibid., 174.
The lessons of the 1973 and 1979 crises continue to have a great impact on
today's strategic thinking. Governments as well as major financial institutions are
considering ways to overcome possible future problems. They are also trying to secure
reliable and financially profitable investments. The newly-discovered energy resources
exist in mostly either economically and politically risky or geographically hard to reach
areas of the world. Transportation of crude oil requires long and costly processes. Most of
the world's oil production is distributed by tankers and this distribution system is only
possible when a pipeline web is built between the source and the markets or between the
source and other shipment terminals to support maritime transportation. These pipeline
webs mostly pass through several countries. The more countries and regions the pipeline
passes through, the harder it becomes to decide on a planned route, or to build and
manage transportation. The process of bargaining between states, multinational
companies and powerful individuals may be prolonged. It may cause tensions among the
interested parties and may have significant efffects on regional and world politics. The
intended route may not be profitable to most of the states involved and policies may
change from the original starting point because of the limited options. Even under the
most beneficial conditions every step of a pipeline's construction deserves a detailed
evaluation. Governments, multinational finances, international organizations and key
persons that occupy authoritative positions all have stakes in energy investment and
security issues.
The search for new oil resources in the last decade has provided some positive
results in the North Sea, South America and the Far East with the discovery of new oil
fields. But the demise of the Soviet Union had much more impact on the oil industry. The
demise of the Soviet Union fundamentally altered the conditions of petroleum investment
initiatives. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, three new petroleum and natural gas-
rich states emerged around the Caspian Sea: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.
Considered a backwater during the Soviet era, these countries and the Central Asian
states could play a pivotal role in Eurasian and world politics in the years ahead.
Even though the Soviets paid little attention to the Caspian Sea, this region has
recently attracted more concern from Western governments and private companies.
According to Stephan Kinzer, today:
Estimates of total reserves in the Caspian and the lands around it run up to
200 billion barrels, enough to meet the entire energy needs of the United
States for thirty years or more. The value of the vast reserve is measured in
trillions of dollars, and foreign companies are expected to invest fifty
billion dollars or more merely to extract it. 7
The strategic implications of this "gusher" hypnotize Western security planners as well as
oil executives.
The political implications for the countries concerned, signify multiple challenges
for the region and highlight the potential for both intra- and inter-state conflicts.
Neighboring powers have considerable interests in the region. Russia is still the most
important regional actor, but Turkey and Iran are also significant players. The United
States moreover has both political and economic means to implement a powerful strategy
in support of its national interests. Even though the region is rich in energy resources,
local conflicts, political instability and a lack of cooperation endanger its security.
The western route for "early oil" from Azerbaijan for example passes just north of
the breakaway Azeri region of Nagorno-Karabakh, drawing Russia, Iran and Armenia to
one side of the conflict, and thereby placing Azerbaijan, Turkey and Israel on the other
side of the conflict. There are ethnic separatist struggles in Abkhazia and Osetia in
Georgia, Dagestan and Chechenya in Russia. These struggles seem unlikely to end in the
near future. Due to the artificial boundaries drawn in the Soviet era, major concentration
of ethnic minorities reside within countries other than their titular nations and this also
cause unrest between neighbors.
Exporters of Caspian Sea Basin oil currently use the former Soviet pipeline, rail
and tanker shipment systems to transport oil to markets, but Main Oil Pipeline (MEP)
route competitions continue among countries and companies. Russia is trying to maintain
7 Stephen Kinzer, " A Perilous New Contest for the Next Oil Prize," The New York Times, 21
September 1997 [newspaper on-line]; available from http://search.nytim/.../fastweb/caspianandpipelines;
Internet; accessed 25 August 1999.
its monopolist advantage in transit by building the MEPs in its territory and opposing
routes that would enable other sources of oil and gas to compete in Russian export
markets. 8 Turkey, on the other hand, is trying to convince multinational companies to
build a MEP passing through its territory and linking Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey
economically and politically. The multinational companies are waiting for possible
changes in U.S. relations with Iran to build a less costly pipeline terminating in the
Persian Gulf. U.S. policy makers are attempting to free these new states from dependence
on Russia and to do so without them growing closer to neighboring Iran. U.S. policy
makers are also encouraging these states to create "an East-West Trans-Caspian gas
pipeline from Turkmenistan to Turkey and a main export pipeline from Azerbaijan."9
Both policies "give Russians genuine cause for concern" 10 and most intimidating for
Russia is the U.S. support for the growth of Turkish influence in the region. 1
!
While states try to implement their foreign policies in the region, domestic politics
cause trouble for policymakers by putting them into multidimensional dilemmas.
The United States government attempted to back Azerbaijan in political matters,
but "America's role was constrained by the activism of the Armenian-American
community." 12 The United States is trying to "roll back" Russian influence from the
Caucasus, but is also helping Armenia, which has allowed Russia to station military
forces on Armenian soil. The U.S. policy makers verbally back Turkey in its struggle with
8 Paul Goble, "Pipelines and Pipe Dreams: The Geopolitics of the Transcaucasus," Caspian
Crossroads Magazine, No.l, winter 1995 [periodical on-line]; available from http://ourworld.CompuServe,
com/homepages/usazerb/l.htrnl; Internet; accessed 10 October 1999.
9 Martha Olcott, "Caspian Sea Oil Exports," Testimony for Subcommittee on the International
Economic Policy, [document on-line]; available .from http://www.ceip.org/people/olcaspw.htm; Internet;
accessed 27 August 1999.
10 Anatol Lieven, "Ham Fisted Hegemon: Clinton Administration and Russia," Current History,
Vol.98 (October 1999): 313.
11 Ibid., 315.
12 Hafiz Pashayev, "Shaping Azerbaijan's Geopolitical Future," Summary of Remarks in CSCIS
Conference, 19 July 1999 [on-line]; available from http://www.cscis.org/turkey/event9907 19Pashayev.html;
Internet; accessed 2 September 1999.
the lenders to convince them about the need for a main oil pipeline on Turkish soil. But
this support does not seem to be strong when its consequences are examined. The United
States also seems to be caught between deciding on containing Russian intentions in
Caucasus and giving in to Russia's priorities. The differences in the decision-making
processes in these countries also make solving the multilateral problems more difficult.
Turkey is trying to relax tensions with Armenia, but is constrained by the
unresolved conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. While Turkey tries to change
assumptions about its Kurdish terrorism and its consequences on pipelines abroad, it also
strives to overcome relation problems with Russia.
Russia fears Islamic radicalism but also "regards Tehran not as a threat but as an
important ally." 13 While Russia tries to maintain its own stability domestically, it also
tries to cause instability in the "Near Abroad" at a level sufficient to frighten away other
outside players but to prevent this instability from spilling over into the Russian
Federation or inviting international involvement. 14 The Newly-Independent States (NIS)
of the region still have domestic and international problems. Their interests are also
important factors in regional politics. They still cannot produce firm policies and their
preferences in a possible alliance with different regional powers may change the policies
of big powers. As a result of complex and overlapping geopolitical issues, the future of
these energy rich new states' is also in question.
Generally the region is still unstable and the future of energy resources are still
undecided. The western penetration started just after the demise of the Soviet Union but a
decade long process did not give accountable results in the region. There are possibilities
that instability in the region may continue and even heighten. Russia may restore its
dominance for an indefinite period of time or this region may reach a new balance.
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
"political, ethnic or other strife in the Caspian region would have repercussions far
13 Anatol Lieven, "Ham Fisted Hegemon," 314.
14 Paul Goble, "Pipelines and Pipe Dreams."
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beyond its immediate shores." 15 Whatever the reasons and consequences are, routing of
new oil and gas pipelines from the Caspian basin will greatly influence the region's future
geopolitics.
Experts on Caspian oil issues assert different approaches to the subject. Two
major approaches, policy oriented and finance oriented literature, make most of the
groundwork for this study. The policy-oriented school of thought considers the regional
balance of power, national security and economic benefit, while the latter mostly
concerns economic logic based on commercial and financial analysis. The literature about
the Caspian oil pipeline includes some misperceptions when evaluating the Turkish
option. These misperceptions also understate the importance of regional actors and their
interests. This thesis is modeled after current research, but revises some issues and
emphasizes others.
This thesis further argues that resources and developments around Caspian are
important because of the energy security and regional stability. Under any condition, the
Caspian is going to contribute significantly to the global energy supply. In case of
instability in the Middle East, Caspian resources could bridge the resulting gap. However
the region needs a stable oil and political regime. Tiny new states around the Caspian Sea
do not have the means to guarantee their futures. Continuing instability or the restoration
of Russian control throughout the region would not be in the U.S., Turkey or the regional
interests, but policies, which are not precisely calculated, may lead to this end. Turkey
and the United States have common interests in the region and their cooperation helps the
global economic and political stability. This thesis also argues that although economic
factors are important, energy geopolitics plays a decisive role in determining the fate of
oil pipelines in this part of the world. A rational decision can be a good balance between
economic and geopolitical factors. There could be a need to revise the current policies.
Firmer U.S. support for Turkish option best serves to their own interests. The United
15 Ben Partridge, "Central Asia: Caspian Resources Provide Alternative to Middle East," Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 5 January 2000 [publication on-line]; available from http://www.rferl.org/nca/
features/2000/0 1/F.RU. 000105125920.html; Internet; accessed 5 January 2000.
States, Turkey and the oil-producing countries' economic, geopolitical interests are at
stake within the security problems of Caspian Sea basin.
This thesis analyzes the politics of oil in the Caspian Sea basin on the basis of
recognized primary and secondary sources. Examines some of the historical and
theoretical questions with a view to rethinking some basic policy issues. The analysis
examines the subject in its historical context, dealing with general, national and regional
oil policies. It will focus on the United States and Turkey's interests and will identify
commonalties and differences. Given this framework, the subject is divided into four
main sections. Chapter II examines the background and describes current and proposed
pipelines while trying to give key features of oil politics in the region that the U.S. and
Turkish policymakers must consider. It also describes regional and non-regional actors
and their stakes. Chapter III evaluates U.S. policies' benefits and restraints while
evaluating current implications. Chapter IV discusses the Turkish interests and policies
and evaluates the problems with the proposed pipelines and its neighbors. Chapter V
analyzes commonalties and disagreements among policies and recommends policies for
future. Chapter VI provides a conclusion.
II. OIL POLITICS IN THE CASPIAN SEA BASIN
Any understanding of the Caspian pipelines and oil politics must be based on an
accurate and valid account of Caspian energy reserves with reference to the world's total
resource database. According to a report delivered by the State Department to the United
States Congress in 1997 "proven reserves" in the Caspian region runs around sixteen
billion barrels. 16 Most geologists currently classify "proven" reserves between twenty
billion and thirty billion barrels. The above-cited report gives a figure of approximately
145 billion barrels as an estimate for the additional possible reserves. Geological analyses
conducted by the oil companies tend to estimate the reserves somewhere between forty
and seventy-five billion barrels. There are even statements saying this region's "oil
reserves are estimated to be at least as large as those of Iraq and perhaps equal those of
Saudi Arabia." 17 According to optimistic assessments, Caspian reserves are "roughly
equal to a quarter of the Middle East's total proven reserves." 18 But even the smallest
figure would represent a huge opportunity for oil companies. This is also true in
commercial, technical terms, and also in the geopolitical context. Caspian oil can not
replace the Middle East oil, but it can reduce the dependence on the Middle East while
easing the problems in a possible supply disruption. As a multiplier in the global energy
security formula, it also significantly contributes to overall global security. This region is
also a place where new states as well as the neighboring countries cannot help but to be
interested and involved in the region's future as a playing field, trying to gain economical
16 U.S. Department of State, "Caspian Region Energy Development Report," delivered to
Congress as required by H.R. 3610, April 1997, quoted in Laurent Ruseckas, "State of the Field Report:
Energy and Politics in Central Asian and the Caucasus," Access Asia Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, (1998): Essay 2
[report on-line]; available from http://www.nbr.org/publications/review/vollno2/essay2.html; Internet;
accessed 7 February 2000.
17 Richard Pipes, "Is Russia Still an Enemy?" Foreign Affairs, vol. 76, no. 5 (September/October
1997): 73.
18 Erik Kreil, "Caspian Sea Region," Country Analysis Brief, U.S. Department of Energy, Energy
Information Administration, December 1998, [report on-line]; available from http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/
cabs/caspfull.html; Internet; accessed 20 November 1999.
as well as political benefits. As Laurent Ruseckas put it, in the Caspian region "oil is an
important piece of a larger picture." 19
A. CURRENT AND PROPOSED PIPELINES
The Caspian is landlocked because of this reason; exporting crude oil requires
pipelines or rail transportation crossing national boundaries.20 In the Soviet era there were
only a few pipelines in the region and these pipelines were mostly designed in the north-
south direction to link the Soviet Union internally through Russian territory. This network
is underused and comparatively small for the projected vast size of oil to be exported in
the near future. This pipeline is definitely aging-40% of the total length is over twenty
years old, 70% is over fifteen years old-and prone to leaks. 21 The huge volumes of crude
oil are far beyond the capacity of the existing pipelines and export to east or west is
clearly mandatory, but given the capacity and considering the terrain, this requires a
massive investment.
Old pipelines in the Caspian region consist of two networks. First one originates
in the Kazakhstan's Tengiz oil fields, passes through Russian territory, and goes north
towards Samara in Russia. This branch of northern pipeline network also has a regional
segment in a southern direction to Grozny in Chechenya. The second pipeline coming
from Baku in Azerbaijan connects to this segment in Chechen territory. The second
pipeline runs toward Novorossiysk, a Russian Black Sea Port.
Currently a new pipeline carrying Azerbaijan's "early oil" from Baku to Georgia's
Supsa terminal operates to carry a limited amount of Azeri oil from the Caspian. Small
amounts of oil are also shipped by rail and barge through Russia.
With the exploration of new oil fields in the Caspian region two big consortiums
were formed with many comparably smaller ones around the Caspian. The Caspian
19 Laurent Ruseckas, "State of the Field Report."
20 The Don-Volga Canal links Caspian to Black Sea, but its capacity to ship large quantities of oil
is limited because of its physical limitations.
2
' IF Oil and Gas Report, 8 (27 1 ), 28 February 1 997.
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Pipeline Consortium (CPC) was formed to transport oil from Turkmenistan oil fields.
This consortium consists of Russia (24%), Kazakhstan (19%), Chevron (15%), LukArco
(12.5% Russia/United States), Mobil (7.5%), Rosneft-Shell (7.5% Russia-
U.K./Netherlands), Oman (7%), BG (2% U.K.), Agip (2% Italy), Kazakhstan Pipeline
Ventures (1 .75% Kazakhstan), and Oryx (1.75% United States). This consortium decided
on its Main Export Pipeline (MEP) route and has begun construction of a 1.34 million-
bbl/day oil export pipeline between Tengiz oil fields and the Russian Black Sea Port of
Novorosiisk.22 On the west side of the Caspian the Azerbaijan International Operating
Company (AIOC) will export oil from Azerbaijan's oil fields. The AIOC venture decided
to ship its "early oil" through two pipelines. First one is the old Russian northern route
between Baku and Novorosiisk. Transportation from this pipeline started in late 1997
while a second new one from Baku to Supsa concluded the early oil pipeline routes from
Azerbaijan's portion of the Caspian in 1999. AIOC consists of BP (17.1%), Amoco
(17%), Unocal (10%), Statoil (8.6%), Exxon (8%), TPAO (6.8%), Itochu (4%), Ramco
(2.1%), Delta (1.6%), Socar (10%)23 . This ratio represents a 42% in American
companies' share, leaving smaller shares to other partners.
Because the CPC decided on its MEP, most of the discussions about pipeline
issues originate from the undecided AIOC MEP route. There are four primary proposals
to transport Azeri oil to world markets (see Map 1, Map 2). Current "early oil" pipelines
from Baku to the Russian Black Sea port Novorosiisk and Baku to Georgian Black Sea
port Supsa are two of the candidates for AIOC MEP route. Another proposal is to export
Caspian oil directly to the Persian Gulf. Iran has suggested that the best way to export oil
from Caspian should be directly south through Iran by which a new pipeline passing from
Tehran and Iran's pipelines and refineries would transport Azeri oil as well as Turkmen
and Kazakh oil.24
22 Erik Kreil, "Caspian Sea Region."
23 Cynthia Croissant, Azerbaijan, Oil and Geopolitics, (Commack, New York; Nova Science
Publishers, 1998), 114.
24 Erik Kreil, "Caspian Sea Region."
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Map 1. Existing and Potential Oil and Gas Export Routes from the Caspian Basin.
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Selected Oil Infrastructure in the Caspian Sea Region
Source: U.S. Department of Energy, EIA
Map 2. Selected Oil Infrastructure in the Caspian Sea Region.
Another proposal considers the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan as a final
destination for the MEP route for Azeri oil. This pipeline starts from Baku, goes north
toward Supsa, turns south from Georgian territory, and passes Turkish territory diagonally
while terminating in southern Turkey.
As the production from the east side of the Caspian increases, it is expected to
have new pipelines linking this oil to the west. One of the proposals offers to connect the
13
east side of the Caspian with a cross-Caspian pipeline to the existing or to new pipelines
in the west. This proposal favors Turkish option as the MEP route.
Secondary proposals need the realization of at least one of the pipelines proposed
to terminate in the Black Sea. According to these proposals, tankers will carry the crude
oil from the Black Sea Ports to Bulgaria's Black Sea Port Burgas, and will convey it
either through a Macedonian-Albanian pipeline route to the Adriatic or through a Greek
route to the Aegean Sea. There are also plans to transport this oil from Romania with
barges through the Danube-Maine-Rhine en route to Germany or through a pipeline
passing through one of the routes from the north through Hungary or from the south
through Yugoslavia and Croatia. 25 A Ukrainian pipeline route in the central European
direction is also possible in alternative proposals.
Other than European markets there are also proposals to transport oil from
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to China and to Pakistan via Afghanistan.26 These two
proposals seem to be the only eastern route proposals among the others discussed until
now.
Each pipeline proposal about the Caspian oil transportation contains a wide
variety of indigenous problems, ranging from economic inviability to physical
impossibility, domestic politics to regional instability and more. First of all, because oil
companies will pay for the pipeline investments, the cost of pipelines and their
recoverability concerns them more than the other issues. For the state and big power
concerns, this just means a secondary issue. They mostly deal with the balance of power




B. REGIONAL AND NON-REGIONAL ACTORS' INVOLVEMENT
The Caspian Sea is surrounded by five littoral states. Russia, Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, Iran, and Azerbaijan are naturally interested in the issues because of their
producer status.
Most of Azerbaijan's oil resources (proven as well as possible reserves)
are located offshore, and perhaps 30% to 40% of the total oil reserves of
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are offshore as well.27
Because most of the oil in the Caspian region is found in their territory, this situation
promotes Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan to major producer as well as favorable nation
status.
Economic benefits resulting from this potential lead some external powers to
attempt the MEP to be built across their territory: Georgia, Turkey and China. The United
States, on the other hand, both because of financial institution's involvement and the
importance of the region's future for the states' national interests, could not help but to be
actively involved in the regional politics. Some other countries like Ukraine, Romania,
Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia and Albania are also trying to become involved in this
process less directly than the former ones. There are also countries like Oman, Norway,
Great Britain and Japan, which are partners to the production and transportation
agreements.
Despite the fact that states are the primary actors in Caspian oil maneuvers, in
today's global economy and financial environment, they have limited power to dictate
projects by themselves. Oil companies play a decisive role in choosing the pipeline routes
in the Caspian Sea Basin. Without their willingness to contribute capital and risk
management competence, it is hard to build pipelines. This position sometimes puts them
on opposite sides and the ensuing economic logic and competition among the states
complicate the pipeline rivalries.
The Newly-Independent States (NIS) of the Caspian region are supposedly
governed by democracies, but a legacy of communism and a long history of authoritarian
27 Ibid.
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rule in these countries force us to also see powerful individuals as important players.
Currently Caspian nations do not own liberal democracies and liberal leaders. With only
some progress in political life most of the state power resides in the hands of powerful
statesmen.
C. POLITICS OF OIL IN THE WORLD AND IN THE CASPIAN SEA
REGION
Petroleum reminds most people of the Middle East or platforms on the North Sea.
In fact the Caspian deserves to be known as the historical origin of oil. The 13 th century
explorer Marco Polo reported that springs in Azerbaijan "bubbled with black goo that
was good to burn."28 In 1873, Robert Nobel, brother of Alfred Nobel, built up the
region's leading oil company and at the end of the 19th century, Baku was the world's
number one source of oil. "The Nobels built the world's first oil tanker, which transported
oil across the Caspian Sea while the Rothchilds financed a railway line between Baku and
the Black Sea Port of Batumi in Georgia.29 According to Daniel Yergin and Thane
Gustafson until the middle of the 20th century, Azerbaijan remained the largest European
oil supplier. Capturing Baku was Hitler's top strategic objective when he invaded the
Soviet Union in 1941.30 After World War II, "the Soviet Union began to neglect the
historic Azerbaijani fields, production fell, and the importance of the Caspian Sea as an
oil-producing region declined."31 Soviet oilmen turned their attention to the Urals and
28 Daniel Williams, "Oil Soaked Azeris Find Affluence Elusive," Washington Post, 7 September
1998, A15.
29 Audrey L. Alstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity Under Russian Rule (Stanford,
CA: Hoover Institute Press, 1992): 21.
30 Daniel Yergin and Thane Gustafson, "Evolution of an Oil Rush," New York Times, 6 August
1997 [newspaper on-line]; available from http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/oilrush.htm; Internet;
accessed 23 November 1999.
31 Robert Barylski, "Russia, the West, and the Caspian Energy Hub," Middle East Journal
(Vol.49, No.2, spring 1995): 218.
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then to the West Siberia for the resources that made the Soviet Union the world's largest
oil producer, ahead of Saudi Arabia, by the 1980's.32
This region of the world was an area for the competition of empires from the early
19
l
century. While there were many rivals, the principles were fought between Russia
and Britain. At that period, lands around Caspian were viewed in terms of military
reward. The land between Europe and India was the great prize for the winner of the
competition. With the Bolshevik revolution, this rivalry ended and nations of this vast
land became Soviet citizens. During its last thirty years, the Soviet regime gave priority to
the oil and gas fields in the Russian Federation while depriving the littoral states of a
higher standard of living. The Soviet administration linked the Siberian fields to the
Western markets33 but not the Caspian fields. Under Soviet rule the transportation of
energy was made only through a single line of integrated USSR-wide pipeline grid. This
grid was firmly sealed off from linkages with all the countries to the south, creating an
unnatural situation.34
From Moscow's point of view, it made neither political nor economic
sense to permit general, open competition by the fifteen constituent
republics for foreign investment and foreign export market shares. 35
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Soviet energy system also collapsed,
each republic took over the present energy infrastructure and an opportunity for the
western states and oil companies emerged.
Currently there are many companies and states investing in the Caspian region and
interactions between markets, big petroleum companies, states, OPEC and International
Energy Agency are defining the international oil regime. The main aspect of this regime
32Daniel Yergin and Thane Gustafson, "Evolution of an Oil Rush."
33 Robert Barylski, "Russia, the West, and the Caspian Energy Hub," 218.
34 S.Frederick Starr, Thomas R. Stauffer and Julia Nanay, "Caspian Oil: Pipelines and Politics,"
Middle East Policy (Vol.5, No.4, January 1998): 27-50 [on-line]; available from ABI Information Services
(NPS domain) http://proquest.umi.com; accessed 4 October 1999.
35 Ibid.
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is supposedly free trade, but it is not immune to manipulations and changes by big oil
cartels, powerful states or organizations of oil producing countries. The interdependence
among the elements of the system brings forward a sensitive structure with much input.
Until the 1980s the international oil regime was mostly an outcome of decisions by OPEC
because of its power. Today this regime is mostly a product of trade, bargaining and
compromise in a freer environment with many more effective elements. A powerful
element of this system OPEC produced almost 40% of the world's crude oil production in
1997.36 Although its "demise has been predicted regularly since ...1986, it survives with
11 members... controlling 78% of the world's oil reserves."37 According to Energy
Information Administration (EIA), OPEC's share is expected to be essentially unchanged
by the end of the year 2005. Former Energy Secretary Frederico Pena on the other hand
predicts a rise in the Middle East's share of world oil exports. Comments contributed to
him assert that "the Middle East's share will ...be significantly higher in 2010 than its
current level of about 50%."38 Considering the United States' 36% and 49% imported oil
dependency as an example in the years 1973 and 1993 39 and expectations for an
accelerating worldwide oil demand over the next five years, we can say that this seriously
effects countries that import large quantities of oil. According to the EIA's data, the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new petroleum resources coincide
with a period of increasing world dependence from 31% to 42% on OPEC crude
production between the years 1987 and 1993. As of 1997 the former Soviet Union was
36 Nael Davis, "Woldwide Petroleum and Natural Gas: Prospects through 2005," Energy
Information Administration, June 1998 [on-line]; available from http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/flnance/
usi&to/Up_98.html; accessed 6 April 2000.
37 Oil & Gas Journal, (9 March 1998): 39-41 [on-line]; available from ABI Information Services
(NPS domain) http://proquest.umi.com; accessed 1 February 2000.
38 John H. Lichtblau, "U.S. Caspian Area Foreign Policy in Conflict With Resource Plans," Oil &
Gas Journal, (11 August 1997): 19-22 [on-line]; available from ABI Information Services (NPS domain)
http://proquest.umi.com; accessed 18 November 1999.
39 Patrick Crow, "Remembering the 1973 Embargo," Oil & Gas Journal, 11 October 1993, 32
[on-line]; available from ABI Information Services (NPS domain) http://proquest.umi.com; accessed 18
November 1999.
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the third largest oil-producing region behind Saudi Arabia and the United States.40 This
region's oil production is expected to be more than the world's average oil production
increase in the years ahead. When its consequences are calculated, it is clear that Caspian
oil will be another input for global energy regime with positive effects and increasing oil
investor interests day by day.
Today's international energy regime is different from 1973's energy environment.
Since then the world has drastically changed. In today's world countries are much more
dependent on the global oil market for basic energy resources than 25 years ago, but they
are much less vulnerable to the risks involved. This is not because the problems have
diminished and new solutions were found. Instead, countries have developed new and
successful policies to deal with the possible problems of short-term supply disruptions.
Furthermore a growing number of non-OPEC oil producers helped diversify the oil
resources of various countries. One fact has remained, the political use of oil still exists.
Because energy is a global commodity, its price and availability may have global
implications. In this environment, markets generally define the energy policies. Because
the primary concern for investors and financial institutions is economic gain, their
rationales are clearly with anyone and with any path that brings money in the end. If
governments help financial institutions do business with any producer country, both may
share the same policies while dealing with the issues. If a contradiction arises between
them, both may face problems to eliminate the discrepancies. In any case, any power or
any institution cannot guarantee the maintenance of the security of domestic and global
energy markets. Almost every country tries to collect a specific amount of reserve to
overcome sudden supply interruptions and to find other energy resources, which can
replace oil.
Obviously competition for Caspian oil cannot be excluded from the general
framework of the international oil regime. But, clearly, Caspian region has the distinction
of being a playfield with too many actors and too many influences. This distinction forces
the players to employ more classical terms of international relations. The independent
40 Nael Davis, "Worldwide Petroleum and Natural Gas."
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states of the Caspian region so far have failed to establish sustainable strategies for
economic development and prospects vanished over a bulk of problems. These factors
reinforce the weak position of the states of the region within the international system.
Because of this reason regional politics are determined by the policies of the larger
regional powers like Russia, Turkey and Iran, and major outside powers like the United
States and European Union. This leaves little place for the intentions of countries of the
region themselves. Even the economic prospects of the problems cannot be applied
without the intervention of region's big economies.
The history of the Middle East pipelines illustrates that few pipelines have
managed to exist in politically volatile areas:
Successful pipelines (Algeria-Tunisia-Italy; Paraguay-Brazil; Algeria-
Morocco-Spain) seem to be based on depoliticised environment, private
law models and avoidance of much state involvement. The consequence of
these difficulties is usually a multiplication of political risk.41
Supporting this argument, in the Caspian there is not a single route that traverses a
country that is totally politically stable. The Caspian region is already under political risk
and most of the questions seem to be dependent upon how to deal with the issues.
D. INTERESTS OF THE PARTIES
Billions of dollars are at stake for the governments of the Caspian, international
oil companies and the transit countries bringing this oil to markets. Even at today's low
prices, the oil in the Caspian region has a market value of $2.2 trillion.42 And the choice
of pipeline route will determine not just the overall price of the projects but also how its
costs and benefits will be distributed to the parties involved.
41 Thomas Waelde, "International Good Governance and Civilized Conduct among the States of
the Caspian Region: Oil & Gas as Lever for Prosperity or Conflict," The Journal, Vol. 4, Article 16 [on-
line]; available from http://www.dundee.ac.ukycepmlp/main/h1rril/journal/article4- 16.htm; accessed 7
February 2000.
42 Martin Josh, "Pipeline to Profits," Management Review, April 1999, 45-50 [on-line]; available
from ABI Information Services (NPS domain) http://proquest.umi.com; accessed 12 November 1999.
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The first winner and loser of Caspian pipelines would probably be the consumer
countries and oil cartels. For the consumers, it does not matter where the oil is sent.
Because of the oil market's global nature, they will still benefit from the abundance of
crude oil. Oil cartels, on the other hand, will lose assets in every case. Given the producer
countries' current struggle with the low oil prices, additional oil from the Caspian region
would force these cartels to struggle with the low prices more than before or to engage in
the Caspian production and transportation themselves.
Producer countries' stakes are larger than outside players because they have
chronic economical, organizational and security problems in the region. Apart from the
obvious problems, piping oil from the region means hard currency for them. Considering
that these countries are the least developed in this part of the world, obviously this
production of oil will highly effect the future economy of these nations. The direction of
the pipeline routes will also define their roles as sovereign or dependent players.
Transit countries will also gain benefits from liabilities or transit fees. They also
will have a controlling hand in regional geopolitics because of their control of the
pipeline. Either through construction processes or through administration of pipelines in
the future, they also will gain interdependence between each other and this will serve as a
bridge between culturally, economically and even ideologically different countries. The
routes of pipelines could even solve military conflicts if they are used as tools for
building regional peace.
The big powers' stakes depend mostly on how they interpret the situation. Their
support for firm and fruitful policies earn more than their investments, while their
interpretation of current policies may deprive them of simple gains. From the big power's
perspectives, apart from the economic aspects, oil is also the core of the
internationalization of the struggle for Caucasus. Their situation requires them to be
flexible enough to fit any situation in the future. Flexible policies may permit a new
sphere of influence in the region and may shape the context of pipeline policies.
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E. PROBLEMS
First of the current problems is economic inadequacy. "Individually, none of the
Caucasus countries is large enough in itself as a market to offer the economies of scale
that normally make major industrial investment attractive."43 Furthermore the
governments are "addicted to centralized control" and presidents make "the final decision
on all major, many medium, and some small issues."44 Like all other multinational
investment issues, pipeline decisions require intergovernmental agreements, contracts and
guarantees for the possible problems. Clearly that for the time being, these countries can
not supply these conditions and without sufficient power and will to supply these,
pipeline decisions may wait for suitable circumstances.
Political instability constitutes another problem. Russia named these republics
according to their principal nationalities, "it drew their boundaries in a way designed to
reduce each native group's potential for political control: Part of this community was
always left stranded in neighboring republics, while ethnic groups with competing
historic claims were joined to the territory."45 Deep ethnic divisions have left these states
separatist enemies to each other for a long time. With the demise of the Soviet Union,
new states found their independence but state building was not easy. Russian economic
dominance left new leaders of the Caucasus alone in their struggle with many old and
new problems. In a deteriorating economy where a border guard or policeman's bribe can
equal six month's salary,46 it is clearly hard to maintain the means for normal
governance.
Construction of new transit routes from the region is currently underway. "Early
oil" pipelines are operational and MEP from Kazakhstan's portion of the Caspian is
43 Michael Lemnon, Ambassador to Armenia, (1999) quoted in Patrick Crow, "Six Ambassadors,"
Oil & Gas Journal, (17 May 1999): 36 [on-line]; available from ABI Information Services (NPS domain)
http://proquest.umi.com; accessed 12 November 1999.
44 Steve Mann, Ambassador to Turkmenistan, (1999) quoted in Patrick Crow, "Six Ambassadors."
45 Martha Brill Olcott, "The Caspian's False Promise," Foreign Policy, (summer 1998): 95.
46 Ibid., 111.
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expected to be finished by the end of 2001, but the proposed pipelines face difficult
problems. An important limitation regarding these pipelines is that most of the current
and proposed pipelines must terminate at the Black Sea Ports and this requires them to
pass through the Turkish straits to reach the Mediterranean and world markets. The
Turkish straits have a limited capacity and the size of tankers which can travel through
these straits are subject to limitations because of both the natural features and the man-
made structure on the sides of the straits.
The proposed pipeline going toward China is an ambitious one, but because of the
terrain and distance between the Caspian region and China, numerous technical
difficulties postpone a comprehensive pipeline agreement. This plan also seems unlikely
to be financially feasible, at least for the near future.
The other eastern proposal for the Caspian oil transportation is restrained by the
ongoing civil disorder in Afghanistan. The proposal was made to transport oil to Pakistan
and possibly to India later on. Low oil prices, U.S. bombing raids for suspected Afghan
strongholds of suspected terrorist, Osama bin Laden, the turmoil in the region and the
high risk involved forced companies and states to delay the decisions for an undetermined
time.47
Baku-Supsa oil pipeline, a candidate for the MEP if realized will compound the
traffic in the Turkish straits and will also require an extra investment. This will require
the building of new terminals with the capacity to load more than 1 million barrels of
crude oil daily.48
A pipeline carrying Caspian oil through Iran economically and technically makes
much more sense than the other options. But United States government does not want to
make large monetary and political investments considering the Islamic Republic's
twenty-one year policy in the region.
A pipeline from Baku to Russian port Novorosiisk travels through one of the least
stable parts of the world. This pipeline starts from Azerbaijan, passes Daghestani territory
47 Erik Kreil, "Caspian Sea Region."
48 Ibid.
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and just before entering Russian soil, cuts through Chechenya. In less than ten years
Chechenya went to war with Russia for the second time:
Before the war broke out in August [1999], constant tapping of the 110
kilometer line through Chechenya made the Novorosiisk route inoperable.
Since the war started, Russia has been carrying Azerbaijani oil by rail to
avoid Chechenya.49
Chechenya and Russia still have not reached an agreement on the country's future. Russia
seems to control the region, yet unresolved conflicts for the last six years has damaged the
efforts to repair the old pipelines. These conditions also imperil the working conditions;
makes it harder to build new lines and forces decision-makers to rethink their plans to
pump oil through this pipeline. It is also likely that in case new pipelines pass through
this region, Chechens will demand a portion of the pipeline or some other kind of
concessions before any projectis implemented.
Turkey owns one of the biggest and most suitable ports for oil transportation from
the Mediterranean but the Turkish option costs more than the other options. As the most
developed state in the region, Turkey also struggles with oil companies' and regional
states' presumptions. Turkey's proposed pipeline passes just across eastern and southern
Turkey. International organizations see Turkey's struggle with Kurdish terrorism similar
to Russia's Chechenya problem.
Trans-Caspian pipeline faces technical, legal, environmental and benefit sharing
disputes among the littoral states. Oil and gas producers of the region are competitors of
the same market and even though Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are friendly
to each other, this does not prevent them from having problems in market sharing
agreements.
To further complicate the problems, the Caspian Sea is subject to conflicting legal
issues. The legal aspect of the Caspian slows down the development of the region. Mainly
these issues involve "whether the development rights [will be] governed by treaties
49 Michael Lelyveld, "Pipeline Project Around Chechnya Fraught with Problems," Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, 6 January 2000 [publication on-line]; available from http://www.rferl.org/nca/
features/2000/01/F.RU.000106133003.hrml; Internet; accessed 3 February 2000.
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signed between the former Soviet Union and Iran (which did not establish seabed
boundaries or discuss oil and gas exploration)."50 Littoral states have different approaches
to the question and all of them try to pursue their economic interests.
Another primary issue is determining if this body of water is a sea or lake. If the
Law of the Sea convention is applied, full maritime boundaries of the littoral states would
be established and undersea resources would also be divided into national sectors. If the
Caspian is accepted as a lake, then the resources need to be developed jointly. Because
much of the oil resources are off shore in their sectors, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan
support establishing national sectors whereas Iran insists on the agreements signed with
the Soviet Union in 1921 and 1940. 51 Russia switches position from time to time while
trying to maintain its beneficial position and Turkmenistan tries to find a mid point
between different policies.
According to some scholars, the Caspian is not a bad bet if someone is looking for
a flashpoint for World War HI.52 But even without a whole scale regional war, the region
itself has enough conflicts. The western route of "early oil" between Baku and Supsa just
passes north of the breakaway Azeri region of Nagorna-Karabakh. Populated mostly by
Armenians, this region became a problem area and cause of a war between the Armenians
and the Azeris. Continuing armed conflicts were mediated by a cease-fire in 1994, but the
Armenians currently control 20% of Azeri territory and a final solution to the problem is
still far from probable. Animosity between neighboring countries prevents them from
cooperating for a shorter pipeline passing through both their countries and Turkey. This
also keeps them from developing mutual benefits in a joint project. The conflict between
Armenia and Azerbaijan pushes the Turkic Azeri nation to reach closer terms with
Turkey and to leave Armenia to other regional rivals, Russia and Iran's hands.
50 Erik Kreil, "Caspian Sea Region."
51 Ibid.
52 Paul Starobin, "The New Great Game," National Journal, (13 March 1999) [on-line]; available
from ABI Information Services (NPS domain) http://proquest.umi.com; accessed 2 November 1999.
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Georgia, another possible alternative to pipelines lost a civil war to its separatist
region, Abkhazia, in 1993. On the north of the country separatist Ossetians are also
posing another threat to Georgia's unitary structure. The situation is so conflicting that
Georgian president, a pro-western statesman, escaped several assassinations and a coup
attempt between 1992 and 1998.
Because of the deadlocks on the negotiations for a pipeline route and reemergence
of the Chechen problem in late 1999, Russia built another pipeline by-passing Chechenya
and passing through Daghestan. Unfortunately, the new route is over twice as long as the
old one creating the opportunity for attack. 53 Probably Chechens will have a slight benefit
from its operation, as a result the new route may be even more vulnerable to interruptions.
Under the current international environment, the United States' Iran and Libya
Sanctions Act (ILSA) still imposes sanctions on U.S. companies prohibiting direct
economic connections to Iran. These sanctions negatively effect U.S.-Iranian and U.S.
regional cooperation in the Caspian issues.
F. GEOPOLITICS OF THE TRANSCAUCASUS: RUSSIA'S CASPIAN
REGIME
One of the important aspects of the Caspian region is this region's long history of
rivalry and Russian rule with dire memories. To analyse this region, one must understand
the motives of the policy makers and the consequences of their actions.
Although the Soviet Union collapsed and new states came forth, Russian interests
in the region did not fade. The demise of the Soviet Union and the end of bi-polarity have
revived the common features of regional rivalry and internal strife. Geopolitical and
strategic interests as well as trade and idealism became the motivation for a renewed
phase of oil politics. For Russia, oil and natural gas in the region meant a $60 billion
' 3 Michael Lelyveld, "Pipeline Project around Chechnya Fraught with Problems."
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investment to be made by the Western Powers and suddenly it lost "its almost 200 year
grip on the region."54 According to Alexei Podberezkin in Russian eyes:
Exploiting their financial and other resources, the West was allegedly
attempting to promote disunity in the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) and weakening Russia's role in the former Soviet republics. 55
Excluding Russia from sharing in these benefits would result in a loss of access to vital
goods, raw materials and services that are located to Russia's south. In fact, in different
ways, Russia still depends on the Transcaucasus. For example:
Two-thirds of the oil drilling equipment it requires is produced in
Azerbaijan; the Sukhoi-25 fighter-bombers are assembled in Tbilisi, and
several components for other military equipment are made exclusively in
Armenia. 56
Furthermore a considerable number of ethnic Russians live in those states. The land-
locked Caspian countries depend on oil and gas exports for hard currency, but they can
access international markets only via Russian pipelines. Russia wants to maintain its
political and economic influence over these newly-independent states by controlling the
future export routes.
Azerbaijan and other petroleum producer countries' free access to markets is their
survival interest, but in an area that is far more distant to the developed part of the world,
Russia has been following a more aggressive and threatening strategy than anyone could
imagine. A senior aide to Georgian President, Eduard Shevardnadze, summarizes the
situation in the region in 1997 as highly critical.
54 Steve LeVine, "Oil Rich Neighbor Eclipsing Armenia." New York Times, 30 March 1998 [on-
line]; available from http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acaaVintrel/armoil.htm; Internet; accessed 23 November
1999.
55 Alexei Podberezkin, "Russia's New Path," BCSIA Occasional Paper (July 1998), Kennedy
School of Government Cambridge, MA: Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project [on-line]; available
from http://ksgnotesl.harvard.edu/BCSIA/Library.nsf/pubs/RusNewPath; Internet; accessed 28 February
2000.
56 Dimitri Trenin, Contested Borders in the Caucasus, Russia's Security Interests and Policies in
the Caucasus Region (BE: VUB University Press, 1996), Ch. Ill [book on-line]; available from
http://poli.vub. ac.be/publi/ContBorders/eng/ch0301.htm; Internet; accessed 7 February 2000
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Everything could blow up at any moment, the West wants the Caspian oil
that Russia regards its strategic reserve; the titular states of the region want
real independence, while Moscow incites separatism in every one.
Corruption abounds and national identity, not to mention the ability for
self-defense, is very weak.57
Even though Russia's power as a state also decreased, it still can ignite problems
and employ the same tactics employed by the Soviet Union. In the past whenever the new
states refused to agree on the terms of a Russian proposal, Russia began using whatever
economic, as well as political and military cards, were available. When for example,
Azeri and Georgian presidents refused to join the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS), Russia began supplying arms and support for separatist movements in these
countries.58 Similar hidden threats were used to convince other new leaders to join the
CIS and to receive security guarantees. According to Martha Brill Olcott, in Kazakhstan,
factories were regularly left without power, and in Turkmenistan, Russia only granted
access to its pipelines if Turkmenistan agreed to ship gas to bankrupt CIS states leaving
the "hard currency" customers in Europe to Russia. These problems with "Russia's
belligerence made the Caspian states look for foreign partners who could help finance
new transit routes."59
Presently for economic purposes, Russia carries out five main policies in the
region. First of all, by using its power, Russia dictates that new producers have to export
all their oil through Russian pipelines. If it cannot manage to do this, it tries to minimize
other possible options. Secondly, by forcing these southern neighbors to ration some of
their energy to the CIS, Moscow assures the producer's poverty. Third, it creates debts to
Russia and forces these countries to pay those debts in the form of refining and
processing facilities. Fourth, it also uses western credit to manage these ambitions, and
finally if Russia cannot get a share in the international consortia it tries to get those shares
57 Thomas Goltz, "Caspian Oil Sweepstakes," The Nation, (17 November 1997): 18-21 [on-line];
available from ABI Information Services (NPS domain) http://proquest.umi.com; accessed 19 June 1999.
58 Martha Brill Olcott, "The Caspian's False Promise," 96.
59 Ibid. 97.
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through the Caspian states.60 In fact, Russia's moves can be interpreted as a beginning to
recapture the dominant position in its southern region by exploiting control of pipeline
networks, manipulating ethnic conflict and using any other means available. According to
observers "Russia" makes use of "frozen conflicts that allow Russia to play one side
against the other while threatening the oil export routes."61 Influential Moscow hard-
liners believe that instability in the Caucasus enhances Russia's power in the region.62
Extraordinarily, Russia's foreign policy elite even privately and publicly criticizes their
own oil companies' actions according to economic interests.63
Starting from October 1992,64 Russia initiated a diplomatic campaign against
international projects.
On numerous occasions significant warnings came from behind the walls
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stating that 'unilateral actions' at the
Caspian are illegal and will not be recognized by Moscow; that reserves
the right to take necessary measures at any convenient time. 65
Such a formulation practically needs no comments. It means little more than a direct
threat of military force.
60 Frederick Starr, "Power Failure: American Policy in the Caspian," The National Interest,
(spring, 1997): 20-31 [on-line]; available from ABI Information Services (NPS domain) http://proquest.
umi.com; accessed 2 January 2000.
61 Ariel Cohen, "U.S. Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia: Building a New 'Silk Road' to
Economic Prosperity," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 1 132, 24 July 1997, 9.
62 Ariel Cohen, "Ethnic Conflicts Threaten U.S. Interests in the Caucasus," Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder, No. 1222, Executive Summary, 25 September 1998, 2.
63 Laurent Ruseckas, "State of the Field Report."
64 Russian policies in the region passed through a retraction from the region with the demise of the
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Starting from the independence of the new states, Russia was not seeking an equal
partnership.66 The Russians still do not want to view regional countries as equal
neighboring states. "Reintegration around Russia and under its auspices remains Russia's
prime foreign policy objective."67 Moscow views the Caucasus as part of its sphere of
influence, and that it should have sole proprietary rights to energy, exclude foreign
influence, and reorientate the new states to its economy. Thus Russia concludes treaties
with Belarus and Armenia and now tries to dominate other weak states. This domination
may be in different forms. Stephen Blank argues that Moscow's hand in two coups in
Azerbaijan in 1993 and 1994 is almost a clear example of this intention.68
Because of the apparent danger of falling into Russian plans, countries are trying
to find ways to overcome their influence and manipulations. In January 1999, Azeri
national security adviser, Vafa Guluzade, urged NATO and Washington to exchange
bases in Turkey with the ones in Azerbaijan in order to defend against external threats
from Russia and Armenia.69 Uzbekistan's announcement of its intention to leave the CIS
common security agreement, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze's plea for a
NATO solution to its Abkhazia problem, and Turkmenistan's reaching out to Pakistan,
Iran and Turkey for assistance are further examples of the uneasiness in this region. These
states are trying to build regional organizations to face common economic, environmental
and even military problems. The GUAM initiative, formed by Georgia, Ukraine,
Azerbaijan and Moldova, clearly shows the intent of the organization to resist Russian
66 Jayhun Molla-Zade, "Azerbaijan and the Caspian Basin: Pipelines and Geopolitics," Caucasus
and Caspian Seminar Transcripts, Kennedy School of Government, Cambridge, MA: Strengthening
Democratic Institutions Project, (1996) [on-line]; available from http://ksgnotesl.harvard.edu/BCSIA/
Library.nsf; Internet; accessed 28 February 2000.
67 Stephen Blank, "Epitaph for a Commonwealth," The World & I, (August 1999): 296-307 [on-
line]; available from ABI Information Services (NPS domain) http://proquest.umi.com; accessed 20
November 1999.
68 Stephen Blank, "Russia, the OSCE and the Security in the Caucasus," Helsinki Monitor, (March
1995) [on-line]; available from http://www.fsk.ethz.ch/osce/h_moni/hel95_3/blank.htm; accessed 7
February 2000.
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economic and military pressure. Considering the new Russian president, Vladimir
Putin's, recent moves, it is easy to predict that Russia will move toward a stronger
government focusing its attention on internal issues and more importantly Russian
patriotism. 70 As a consequence of this, for the countries concerned, Russia's likely
motivation in foreign policy will be to dictate new conditions:
Russia regards the NIS of the Caucasus, as belonging to its 'near
abroad'... Russia's chief claim is that it has specific interests to defend this
part of its southern flank. 71
In its policies in the region, Russia sees economic matters from a geopolitical perspective.
A route that by-passes Russia in transporting oil to the world markets is unacceptable to
Moscow.72 In Zbigniew Brzezinski's words northern route for the "early oil" was a
product of the Russian ultimatum to Azeri President Aliyev "calling for a northern route
only."73 Suha Bolukbasi, commenting about this pressure, said:
If all things were equal, these newly-independent states would, without
hesitation, have opted for a Turkish route. Yet Russia holds such carrots
and sticks as geographical advantage, political and military clout, and
capability and readiness to doom various Caspian Sea projects....74
One of the subjects that troubles countries as well as oil companies is the traffic in
the Turkish straits. Russia tends to see Turkey's straits policy as a political problem. They
assert:
70 Rafik Kurbanov, "To Understand Post Communist Russia, Look Turkey," Bridge News, 28
January 2000 [on-line]; available from LEXIS/REGNWS/CURNWS/RUSSIA, KR-ACC-NO: BN-OPIN-
RUSSIA; accessed 2 February 2000.
71 Bruno Coppieters, The Caucasus as a Security Complex, Contested Borders in the Caucasus
(BE: VUB University Press, 1996): conclusion [book on-line]; available from http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/
ContBorders/eng/conclusi.htm; Internet; accessed 7 February 2000.
72 Ibid.
73 Paul Starobin, "The New Great Game."
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There are no real insurmountable technical or ecological problems here; it
is that the Turks want to force the oil community to choose the Baku-
Ceyhan option for the transportation of 'big time' oil from Azerbaijan. 75
Contrary to Russian criticism, Turkey in 1994 changed the regulations, which provides
free passage of commercial tankers from the straits. Although Russia claims that this
contradicts the Montreux Straits Convention (1936), the United Nations International
Maritime Organization (EVIO) approved the Turkish proposal for a security package.
Russia not only interferes with its former republics but also does not hesitate to
use means to contain Turkish influence in the Caucasus. Russians are hindered by the
Chechen problem, but they openly accuse Turkey of supporting Chechens and also try to
use the Kurdish separatism in Turkey as an issue. As an example of this, on 22 May 1998
Aleksander Nevzorov, a member of the Russian Parliament's Committee on Geopolitical
Affairs at that time, acknowledged that "if necessary... [they were] capable of using the
Kurdish question in [their] relations with Turkey."76 At the same time, General Yuri
Yefrenov asserted that:
An independent Kurdish state must be created. The Kurds do not have
effective weapons, but they have a lot of manpower. . . we would be able to
provide the Kurds arms via Armenia: by helping the Kurds, we help
ourselves. 77
Apart from indirect contention, there is also a possibility for a direct-armed conflict
between Russia and Turkey. In 1993 when the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan
deteriorated, Turks began discussing the possibility of intervening on behalf of
Azerbaijan. This Turkish sympathy for Azeris "led Russian leaders to threaten a nuclear
75 Feliks Kovalev, "Caspian Oil: Russian Interests," International Affairs (Moscow, spring 1997):
53 quoted in Ibid.
76 Robert Olson, "Turkish and Russian Foreign Policies, 1991-1997: the Kurdish and Chechenya
Questions," Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, (October 1998): 209-227 [on-line]; available from ABI
Information Services (NPS domain) http://proquest.umi.com; accessed 27 September 1999.
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war in that case."78 According to analysts because Turkey is a NATO ally, the danger of a
major war is higher here than almost everywhere else. Yuri Fedorov adds that any use of
Russian military for political purposes in the region may also cause severe actions from
Turkey, and then Transcaucasia may turn into a possible theater of military struggle with
Turkish forces.79 Of course, in fact Turkey and Russia are partners as well as rivals.
Consider the following:
Bilateral trade amounts to S14 billion. Turkey purchases major quantities
of natural gas from Russia. There are 30,000 Turkish workers and some $6
billion invested by the Turkish construction sector in Russia. 80
With its current policies, Russia neither solves regional problems nor leaves the region to
follow its own path. Its leaders still do not have clear and consistent policies that would
postulate suitable solutions to the complex ethno-national, economic, political and social
relations in the region. 81
Another important concern for decision-makers is Iran. Although Iranian export
routes from both sides of the Caspian Sea have the advantage of directness and refraining
from dealing with Russia, they bring forward another vast problem. These routes offer
Iran too much control. Iran is moving toward a more moderate state of government but it
still is not an open society. Iran's sponsorship of terrorism, nuclear armament program,
unchanged position in the Middle East Peace Process, exporting religious extremism and
ambition to get an important position in world energy sector all occupy security planners
thoughts about this country. Mark N. Katz also points out the increasing cooperation
78 Stephen Blank, "Instability in the Caucasus: New Trends, Old Traits," Jane's Intelligence
Review, (1 May 1998): 18 [on-line]; available from ABI Information Services (NPS domain) http://
proquest.umi.com; accessed 27 December 1999.
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International Relations Occasional Paper, [on-line]; available from http://www.cpss.org/casianw/
fedorov.htm; Internet; accessed 31 January 2000.
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between Russia and Iran on several issues like arms sales, support for mutual political
goals and military pressure on Azerbaijan. 82 Sheila Heslin argues that Russia and Iran are
maneuvering to support an Iranian route for a pipeline built from Azerbaijan. 83 On three
fundamental issues Russian and Iranian interests seem to be quite similar. Neither of them
wants an increase in the political influence of the United States or Turkey, neither of them
wants a powerful sovereign Azerbaijan and neither of them wants to give up offshore
profits from the Caspian division. 84 Both Russia and Iran see Turkey as a threat because
of its economic, political and cultural proximity to Caspian states. Interestingly Russia
also enjoys the problems between Iran and the United States and Turkey. Owing to these
tensions, Russia gains a higher priority in U.S. thinking and also a more favorable status
in pipeline routes. While dealing with regional rivals, Iran fears its own ethnic Azeri
citizens and searches for ways to contain Azerbaijan from becoming a representative for
all ethnic Azeris. Iranians also fear losing the opportunity to have closer relations with the
new states if Turkey replaces Iran by offering more favorable structures to those states in
bilateral relations. This environment motivates Iran to prevent the regional countries from
becoming hostile collaborators with the West and with Turkey. There is a real danger if
these countries fall into the ideology of Islamic fundamentalism just after communism.
Because examples of extremist governments in the world show that these countries could
easily endanger regional and global security. This competition between Iran and Turkey
encourages a rapprochement between Israel and Turkey. For Israel Caspian oil means a
non-Arab oil source close to home, and if this oil is transported through a friendly
country, it serves Israel's own interests. In this way Israel may secure its future oil needs.
In a free-trade environment, the rules of the competition can be bargaining and
economic rivalry. In the former Soviet states, it is a sad truth that considerations of power
and necessity rather than principles of equality, justice and free competition replace legal
82 Mark N. Katz, *'An Emerging Russian-Iranian Alliance?" Caspian Crossroads Magazine, Vol.4
(winter 1995/96): 21-24.
83 Sheila N. Heslin, "The New Pipeline Politics," New York Times, 10 November 1997, A.31.
84 Laurent Ruseckas, "Energy and Politics in Central Asia and the Caucasus. 1 '
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and just principals, especially in the international arena. This completely changes the
rules of engaging pipeline politics. Clearly, pipelines will not be built it they do not make
economic sense. And although only oil really matters for the West and the western
businesses, other parts of the Caucasus and oil-game competition can impose
considerable negative effects on the developments in the region and beyond. To
paraphrase Frederick Starr: whoever controls the oil, controls the fate of the countries of
Central Asia and Caucasus. 85
In the contemporary world many conflicts are generated by local factors but most
of them also include a possible escalation to a greater war. There is a real need for
decision-makers to consider the specific aspects of the Caspian Sea region while choosing
pipeline routes. As stated earlier, Caspian is not a region for which normal rules of
international law and international relations apply. Indeed, there is a huge amount of oil,
but only a limited number of pipelines would be economically rational. Russia is still an
important player, but it has limited capabilities. Moreover, exaggerating Russia's power
may encourage it to act irresponsibly. There is a real danger that leaving these countries to
their own destinies or to Russia's hands may have unpredicted effects.
Another danger for the littoral states is to be caught between big power politics.
To give investors the first priority and biggest shares might have the same consequences,
like surrendering them to Russian or Iranian interests. There can be improvements in the
attitudes and structures of the interested countries but important decisions must be build
on concrete structures and long-term assessments. Non-regional actors' priorities can be
shaped by different criteria than regional parties. Any assessment made by the former
criteria may not solve the latter' s problems. For sure, legacies of the past may help us
understand the problems, but some of the legacies may need to be changed by outside
actors. A good decision about regional politics must include as much input as possible.
There is also a need to have regional allies to implement decided policies. A cooperation
with regional states and continuous dialog between rivals help to decrease the current
tensions. In order for any policy to succeed globally that policy must first succeed in
85 S.Frederick Starr, Thomas R. Stauffer and Julia Nanay, "Caspian Oil: Pipelines and Politics.
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Caspian countries. While decision-makers implement policies, they must consider present
alliances and suitable environment. As long as political motivation in Iran and Russia
continues to be the same, giving them an upper hand in the regional policies hampers the
Caspian states' situation. Furthermore regional countries and their leaders' pleas must be
heard and their opinions must be taken seriously for every single political evaluation.
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III. U.S. INTERESTS AND POLICIES
More than twenty years have passed since the 1970's oil crises awoke the U.S. to
its dependence of global markets, its growing energy needs and the risks involved in this
situation. The United States has adapted to the global oil regime successfully by applying
up-to-date policies. These policies took different forms from time to time. Though energy
security policy generally gave successful results, maintaining the future of energy security
necessitates adjusting to new challenges. Currently the Caspian oil issues comprise an
important part of these challenges in the United States. The United States' policies in the
region are still evolving, and when the implications of the last nine years are considered,
they do not reveal a solid success.
A. EVOLUTION OF U.S. POLICIES AND INTERESTS
In the 1980s, the United States took its first steps to cope with the global energy
interdependence. Presidents Carter and Reagan recognized the importance of the Persian
Gulf. They also recognized that the energy regime of the Persian Gulf is dependent on
markets, political and military circumstances. These presidents also pursued policies that
relied on market forces to promote the development and security of alternative routes. 86
Vulnerability to short-run supply interruptions was appropriately managed by the
maintenance of a Strategic Petroleum Reserve. Vulnerability to long-run market
concentrations, on the other hand, were handled by policies encouraging global supply
diversification. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the election of Mr. Clinton, a
new era in energy policies emerged.
The Clinton administration quickly established diplomatic relations with the
Caspian states just after their independence. Nevertheless outside of the regional
specialists of the National Security Council and in the State Department, the Caspian Sea
86
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April 2000.
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pipeline issue hardly grabbed any attention from official government offices. 87 Initially
Washington was also not too keen on asserting its influence in the region, acknowledging
it as Russia's sphere of influence.88 Washington's low-key policies were illustrated even
in President Clinton's remarks in July 1994: "The U.S.A. would support voluntary moves
by former Soviet Block nations to seek reunion with Russia in a larger eastern European
federation."89 Robert Barylski interprets this situation as a deep and permanent U.S.
commitment to the defense of the Persian Gulfs energy basin and a reluctance to be
drawn into Caspian affairs.90 Another authoritative organization Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace explains administration's initial position differently. In their
interpretation, this was a focus on the domestic transformation of Russia and the heavy
involvement in the domestic political needs of President Yeltsin and a group of "radical
reformers" for democratization. 91
The mutual hesitation and problems associated with bilateral misunderstandings
in the first years lasted between the NIS and the United States from 1991 to 1994. By
1994-1995 the U.S. policy was in a stage of transition. The Azerbaijani oil production
began to grow significantly. During this period American oil companies and their
representatives initiated a campaign to educate members of the Congress and other
87 Jofi Joseph, "Pipeline Diplomacy: The Clinton Administration's Fight for Baku-Ceyhan," WWS
Case Study, (Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 1/99) [paper on-line]; available
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influential statesmen about the region's significant potential. The purpose of the
campaign was to prepare a basis for an active U.S. policy in the Caspian region. An
important event, the war in Chechenya, also changed the perceptions about Russia and
demonstrated to U.S. policy makers the military capabilities of Russia. Active U.S. policy
in the region began at the beginning of 1995.92 Four years had already passed and
Russia's effectiveness in the region was reviving. Russia's pressure on Azerbaijan to
accept the northern route of the "early oil" pipeline was successful and a declaration of
this decision at the end of 1995 showed Clinton administration's weak position counter to
its rhetoric. This neglect also impacted the next phases of U.S. policies:
U.S. policies in the Caspian became increasingly assertive from the second
half of 1996, and the U.S. had announced that it considered the Caucasus
and the Caspian region of 'vital U.S. interests.' 93
These interests needed to be precisely pointed out. The Deputies Committee, a group of
high-level officials and its chairman Sandy Berger, had a big role in defining the United
States' national interests.94 Five main interests were defined:
• strengthening the independence of Azerbaijan and its fellow NIS bordering
Caspian Sea;
• promoting a westward orientation of Azerbaijan and other Central Asian states
and creating a regional framework of cooperation with Turkey;
• diversifying the world's energy supplies, including reducing global
overdependence on the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf;
• excluding Iran from any access to the economic benefits of regional development;
• advancing U.S. corporate interests in the region. 95
92 Jofi Joseph, "Pipeline Diplomacy."
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Although U.S. defined its interests in the region, it faced difficulties formulating these
interests into solid policy objectives. Support for the Turkish option and a motivation for
the trans-Caspian pipeline were declared as in the U.S. and Turkish interests. The U.S.
support for this pipeline dominated official public announcements as well as press
releases. Support for the Baku-Supsa early oil pipeline would also help reach these
objectives. In the following years the Deputies Committee continued working, but
according to Jofi Joseph, because neither Sandy Berger nor his counterpart Strobe Talbott
from the State Department attended the meetings, the group's effectiveness decreased.
Until 1997 high level visits between the countries continued, yet:
AIOC's successive refusals to commit a specific route, culminating in a
final, indefinite postponement of any decision in 1997, created the image
of a disappointing setback for the Clinton administration.96
During the same year at the Helsinki meeting, Washington has quietly permitted an
increase in Russian influence in the Caucasus in exchange for Moscow's tacit consent to
NATO's eastward enlargement in Europe,97 mostly because "Strobe Talbott, President
Clinton's trusted aide on Russian affairs, considered Russia as the foremost U.S. regional
partner."98 When 1998 arrived, President Clinton seeing the need for constant attention to
the developments in the region appointed Richard Morningstar as the special advisor to
the President and the Secretary for Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy. With Mr.
Morningstar' s leadership, a new phase in America's Caspian policy started. Mr.
Morningstar' s personal efficiency encouraged American activities toward regional
developments. Although this new era seemed to be committed99 to the United States,
96 Ibid.
97 Alec Rasizade, "Azerbaijan, the U.S. and Oil Prospects on the Caspian Sea," Journal of Third
World Studies, Vol.16, (spring 1999): 29-48 [on-line]; available from ABI Information Services (NPS
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99 Although U.S. policy makers did refrain from "promising" words like this, the administration's
declarations about Caspian policies reflected strong hopefulness. Contrary to this hopefulness, analysts
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Turkey and regional countries' interests, this phase also achieved mixed success. The
biggest achievement over which the U.S. government rejoiced was the Ankara declaration
among the presidents of Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan in
1998. This declaration was only a formal expression of intention to build the Baku-
Ceyhan MEP and the trans-Caspian pipelines. Even though negotiations and promises
were exchanged to conclude the deal in 1999, this year also passed with some confusion
in U.S. policy circles. During this time, regional countries and investors tried to find a
midway between economical concerns and political objectives. In 1999 the Azeri State
Oil Company, SOCAR, complained about the inoperativeness of the Baku-Novorossiisk
pipeline because of the Chechen war. Azeri complaints also included some severe
warnings toward the interested parties. The actual complaints were a message for
investors and policy makers: The development of the Caspian oil reserves has been
stalled by the ongoing dispute over the routing of pipelines out of the region. U.S. policy
makers, unable to convince investors or to solve embedded difficulties, changed their
attitude. This time the U.S. policy shifted toward a Trans-Balkan pipeline:
The U.S. Secretary of State on Caspian Basin Energy Issues, John Wolf,
announced on July 9 that the U.S. Trade and Development Office (UTDO)
would give between $600,000 to $800,000 for the expansion of the Baku-
Supsa line. 100
Rapidly following this decision, on 20 November, President Clinton signed another
declaration in Istanbul as a witness, favoring the former plan to build Baku-Ceyhan MEP
and Trans-Caspian gas pipelines after the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) summit. This seemed like strong U.S. support toward the Baku-Ceyhan
option. Actually as one administration official said in the press release, "The President
[was] not committing to . . . anything; the President [was] witnessing the signature of the
evaluating U.S. policies saw no commitments. Brzezmski in one of his speeches explained the situation:
'There is a difference between commitment and reinforcement. We are reinforcing their [NIS's] chance to
be independent. We are not in a formal way committing ourselves to security guarantees." Quoted in Paul
Starobin, "The New Great Game."
100
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Istanbul declaration." 101 Not more than two months later the UTDO acknowledgement of
a Trans-Balkan pipeline from the Bulgarian Port of Burgas through Macedonia to Albania
renewed interests in a "January 12 meeting of international oil investors, U.S. Eximbank,
the European Bank of Construction and Development, the World Bank and the U.S.
based Albanian-Macedonian-Bulgarian Oil Company (AMBO)." 102 According to the
same source AMBO would pay $392,000 and UTDO would pay $588,000 for the
required $980,000 feasibility study. The options for the new situation were becoming
clearer, an expansion of the Baku-Supsa line when combined with the construction of the
considered Trans-Balkan pipeline would clearly mean a leaning in the opposite direction
of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. Further developments enhanced this view of America's
Caspian policy, on March 14, 2000 "Iran announced that a Chinese-Swiss consortium
obtained funding from French banks for an oil pipeline project in northern Iran." 103 This
new pipeline would connect Iran's Caspian Seaport of Neka with the existing Iranian
pipeline network as proposed earlier and once operational 370,000 bpd (barrels per day)
of Caspian oil would be shipped directly to the Iran's refining network. 104 This new
pipeline significantly challenged U.S. foreign policy in the Caspian basin and in the
Persian Gulf. Yet even with all the developments from the beginning considered, the U.S.
has calculated its stakes, but a constant and devoted policy did not take shape in the
region.
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Seen retrospectively, the U.S. oil pipeline policies did not mature until recently.
The initial policy evolved from a lack of concern because of a focus on Persian Gulf oil
and the internal stability of Russia. It also included the tendency to consent to Russian
priorities in the region. In its later phases, U.S. policy first saw assertiveness with tacit
support for Turkey and a later phase of stagnation. When the existing policies were not
beneficial the next phase became merely adapting to the situation and moving toward a
less costly pipeline. While the U.S. changed policies, both Russia and Iran developed new
strategies. Even the European Union were granted many concessions from the current
situation.
B. THE BASIS AND THE BENEFITS OF THE CURRENT POLICY
Clinton administration seemed to have intelligently laid the groundwork for a
favorable decision at the beginning of regional interactions. Dealing with the region, the
administration used both private and public diplomacy. In its initial contacts, the
administration often relied on the use of personal relations with influential characters like
Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski who were also serving as consultants for the
oil companies in the region. 105 The administration also tried to use financial aid to
establish closer relations with the regional countries, but because of the U.S. sanctions in
place against Azerbaijan, 106 this assistance lagged behind the prospects and relied on
105 Jofi Joseph, "Pipeline Diplomacy."
106 The U.S. Congress complicated American Policy in the Caspian Sea region by maintaining
restrictive sanctions since 1992 against Azerbaijan for its role in the conflict with Armenia over the
Nagoma-Karabakh conflict. The Freedom Support act passed Congress in 1992, which singled out only
Azerbaijan from any assistance program extended to former Soviet republics until Azerbaijan lifts its
economic blockade of Armenia. The conflict erupted in 1992 in a full-scale war with the Armenians
demanding complete independence for Karabakh or its absorption in Armenia. With Armenian and Russian
help, Karabakh Armenians gained a military victory, controlling 20% of Azeri territory. According to
records, more than one million Azeris became refugees because of this conflict. Currently Armenia does not
concede to any negotiations and opposes pro-American and secular Azerbaijan. Until now Armenia has
refused to recognize the principles put forward by the OSCE and other international bodies. They even
refused a pipeline deal in exchange for peace and reconciliation. According to the Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder 1222, Iran and Russia are key supporters of Armenia. Russia supplied over $1 billion in
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Baku, pays for some Armenian arms purchases. Contrary to this position a vocal and powerful Armenian-
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indirect commercial and financial assistance. The administration has also offered greater
U.S. defense cooperation with these countries through its Partnership for Peace (PfP)
program. But again because of Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, the United States
could not maintain any military links with Azerbaijan. 107 Several attempts were made to
remove the discriminatory parts of the Act, but this did not happen.
The Clinton administration viewed construction of at least one of the MEP
through Turkey as vital to the U.S. as well as its ally's, interests. In this way, the
administration would be investing in a safer route with greater political stability. This
pipeline would by-pass Russia, freeing the NIS from economic dependence and would
also serve to maintain a strict U.S. embargo on Iran. 108 Because American firms hold a
substantial percentage of the Caspian consortiums and their goals have been transporting
the oil by any means, the administration faced the difficulty of challenging the
companies' interests and bargaining for their self-sacrifice. Washington promoted the
independence and democratization of countries and the creation of free markets in the
According to a New York Times' article (30 March 1998), Armenia was among the largest per capita
recipient of American aid, with $87.5 million a year [second only to Israel]. In the Congress Republicans
tried to ease these sanctions with the "Silk Road Strategy Act," but a total removal of this could not take
place because of the powerful lobbies and the Democrats' opposition.
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transition states 109 on top of its Caspian policy. The Clinton Administration even built an
interagency-task group for Caspian issues, run by the National Security Council. All these
initiatives defined interests in the region. According to Julia Nanay, the United States has
even made ending the regional conflicts a primary objective for itself in order to construct
multiple east-west pipelines. 110 According to Jan Kalicki, providing economic and
humanitarian assistance and profits for U.S. companies were also included in this
policy. 111 In Clinton administration's policies a good way to deal with so many complex
issues was integrating of all of these countries, including Russia into the web of Euro-
Atlantic and international institutions. Providing fundamental human rights,
democratization, sponsorship of peace and cooperation were some of the basis of this
policy. Turkey's active foreign policy in the region was also welcomed. 112 Along these
lines many conferences and informative exchanges were made. To facilitate future moves
diplomatic and scholarly discussions were used. When AIOC's early oil pipeline
decisions were announced, the U.S. administration seeing the risk of reliance on either a
Russian or an Iranian MEP, decided to support multiple pipelines in the region. Two
"early oil" pipelines, plus the Trans-Caspian, Baku-Ceyhan and CPC MEP were granted
support in the official declarations. With the war in Chechenya and the Russian
assertiveness in the region, political interests also became clearer. In an effort to preserve
the American interests, in the region decision-makers tried to incorporate policies into the
109 Ian Bremmer, "Oil Politics: America and the Riches of the Caspian Basin," World Policy
Journal, Vol.15, (spring 1998): 27-35 [periodical on-line]; available from ABI Information Services (NPS
domain) http://proquest.umi.com; accessed 25 December 1999.
110 Julia Nanay, "The U.S. in the Caspian."
111 Jan H. Kalicki, "U.S. Policy in the Caspian: Pipelines, Partnership and Prosperity," Middle
East Policy, Vol.6, (October 1998): 145 [periodical on-line]; available from ABI Information Services
(NPS domain) http://proquest.umi.com; accessed 25 December 1999.
112 Turkey's vision of moderate Islam was the driving force under this policy. As a country with
98% Muslim population and a secular state, Turkey was a counterbalance to radical Islam. In Ross Wilson's
"Turkey and the Newly Independent States: The View from Washington," Turkish Foreign Policy Toward
21 s ' Century: Implications for the U.S. and the Region Special Seminar, (Washington Institute, 3-4
September 1997); available from http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/turkish.htm; Internet; accessed
27 October 1999.
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commercial logic. From a financial point, this area was the only oil reserve open to
foreign investment, free of U.S. or any sanctions, which offer good opportunities to
investors in a short time. The short-term objectives became "to keep any Caspian country
from monopolizing regional hydrocarbon transportation; ensure that Caspian production
diversifies sources of worldwide energy supply and avoid aggravating shipping
congestion in the Bosphorus Straits through Istanbul." 113 Such declarations were clearly
acknowledging the mutual interests between the United States and Turkey. 114 According
to followed policies "... when the full range of political, economic and commercial
factors are taken into consideration, Baku-Ceyhan [was] providing a far superior
route...." 115 than the other alternatives. Support for this cause would also serve other
concerns, namely the relations between the United States and Turkey in a context that
Turkey was occupying a special place in the American foreign policy calculus. 1 16 To help
develop activities along these lines, U.S. government's three finance and investment
agencies, the Trade and Development Agency (TDA), the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC), and EXIM Bank made their first major steps to coordinate the
efforts to promote investment projects. They also opened a Caspian Trade and Investment
113 Andrew Dowdy, (Office of International Energy and Commodities.) Quoted in "Sanction
Decision on South Pars Imminent," Oil & Gas Journal, Vol.96, (13 April 1998): 32 [periodical on-line];
available from ABI Information Services (NPS domain) http://proquest.umi.com; accessed 13 November
1999.
114 According to Richard Momingstar, Turkey would play a critical role in this effort, serving as
the geographic, commercial and cultural bridge between the Caspian region and Europe. Turkey was the
United States only NATO ally in the region, it had a geographic significance bordering both European and
regional countries. It also had a common heritage of ethnic ties with the region. Furthermore Turkey's
economy was the most developed among the region and this would facilitate financial and business
connections. Pochard Momingstar, Address to CERA Conference, (Washington, D.C., 7 December 1998);
available from http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/mtrel/morning.htm; Internet; accessed 27 September 1999.
15 Ibid.
116 John Tirman, "Improving Turkey's 'Bad Neighborhood': Pressing Ankara for Rights and
Democracy," World Policy Journal, Vol.15 (spring 1998): 60-67 [on-line]; available from ABI Information
Services (NPS domain) http://proquest.umi.com; accessed 28 November 1999. In the same place it is
emphasized that Ankara and Washington share common concerns on issues like Iraq, Iran, Cyprus, Greece,
the Caucasus, Caspian Sea oil and Turkey's military partnership with Israel. According to the author this
makes Turkey an important ally.
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Finance Center in Ankara. In October 1998 TDA announced a grant of $823,000 to
BOTAS, the Turkish Pipeline consortium for U.S. technical assistance. 117 The Clinton
administration's drive for more support from the congress in financial projects was
obtained by the Foreign Operations Act. 118 Relations with the regional countries
continued to be conducted by high level officials. In order to build a better understanding
and cooperation, consultation meetings were held. The United States also helped the
newly-independent states of the region to get international legal and political help as an
advisory agent. In the world political arena, support was awarded to structures that helped
regional countries build security and economic cooperation. U.S. policy in the Caucasus
even bolstered the region against Russia for a while. 119 The United States, in order to
maintain western influence, especially supported Georgia. The United States has relied on
its NATO ally, Turkey, to help extent U.S. military and political interests. Either through
its own means or its allies' initiatives, GUAM and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
Organization 120 received support from America. Bilateral negotiations between neighbors
with problems were also organized. All these policy initiatives and efforts were
somewhat successful, but because of the inherent problems of the countries and the way
U.S. policy was conducted in the region, this success remained limited. Former American
policy priorities toward the region began to change from their original concern about
democracy, human rights and broad economic development to focus only on the energy
potential. 121
117 Ibid.
118 This Act was encouraging OPIC to raise its internal limits in specific energy projects in the
Caspian. Ibid.
119
"Trans-Balkan Pipeline Complicates U.S.-Turkey Relations," Global Intelligence Update.
120 Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) Organization is an organization built with the
leadership of Turkey in 25 June 1992. The main idea was to develop economic cooperation and better
understandings between the states, which have adjacent borders to the Black Sea. Later membership status
enlarged to eleven participating states; Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova,
Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine.
121 Martha Olcott, quoted in Robert Lyle, "Caspian: Brzezinski Cautions Against Iran from
Pipeline."
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It is obvious that U.S. policy in the region made the conduct of diplomacy easier
for the parties. These links laid the groundwork for future policies. They also educated
both decision-makers and regional countries about the conduct of international relations
in the region. U.S. support for different policies encouraged and motivated them to build
the necessary structures for today's world order. They were also encouraged to find at
least a small amount of state identity in an environment in which Russian and Iranian
pressures were constant. Because of the new states' western inclination and their desire to
be closer to the United States, policy initiatives always found a receptive environment
there. Educational, financial and technical assistance made it easier to cope with the
contemporary problems. State Department and Energy Departments continuously
monitored the developments in the region. The activities and coordination with the allies
revealed other opportunities for cooperation and caused a rapprochement. Economic and
technical, as well as political communication channels were established. But when the
newly-independent Caspian states' current situation, the United States and its regional
allies' declared objectives are compared these successes only present minor importance.
C. RESTRAINTS OF UNITED STATES' POLICIES IN THE CASPIAN
LITTORAL
"The United States policy toward the region after ten years cannot be considered
as successful as it should have been." 122 "The U.S. placed its credibility on the line
through explicit support of a particular pipeline route, cultivated closer relations with
regimes that held dubious democratization records, and risked a further alienation of
Moscow." 123 But only one of the major oil pipelines (Baku-Supsa) was built to U.S.
preferences. 124 Russia and Iran will probably dominate the other lines and the capacity of
122 Huseyin Bagci, "Energy Policy of Politics of Slogans," Turkish Daily News, (Turkey, 15 April
2000), Opinion - electronic edition; available from http://www.nirkishdailynews.com/FrTDN/latest/huseyin.
htm; Internet; accessed 16 April 2000.
123 Jofl Joseph, "Pipeline Diplomacy."
124
"U.S. Loses Influence over Caspian Basin Oil," Special Report.
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The Azerbaijan International Operating Company is composed by BP Amoco, LUKoil, the State Oil
Company of the Azerbaijani Republic, Pennzoil, Unocal, Statoil of Norway, TPAO of Turkey, Exxon, Itochu,
Ramco Energy of Britain and Delta/Nimir.
Source: Stratfor.com
Table 1 . Pipelines and Controlling Interests.
Although in 7 February 2000, BP Amoco, a long-time opponent of the Baku-Ceyhan
project, which also leads the AIOC oil production, announced support in an apparent
changing policy, 125 any new lines may simply be economically infeasible. 126 This
situation on the other hand may seriously undermine the importance given to the
125
"Where is the Oil for the Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline?" Alexander's Gas & Oil Connections, Vol.5,
Issue 2, (7 February 2000); available from http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntc00665.htm; Internet;
accessed 1 1 April 2000.
126
"U.S. Loses Influence over Caspian Basin Oil," Special Report.
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sovereignty, economic and political independence of the three new Caspian countries. 127
"...With the states of the Caspian basin dependent upon petroleum revenues, whoever
controls the routes holds a hammer over the region's economy." 128 With this criteria it is
not difficult to see the geopolitical picture.
There are many reasons for the restraints to this end. Mainly the United States is
carrying out contradictory policies from the beginning. Changing policies and support for
different pipelines mark a major challenge for U.S. foreign policy in the Caspian Basin.
The United States and other regional powers tried to shape the regional structures, but
Russia and Iran implemented more active policies. While the United States focused on
circumventing these two countries, Iran and Russia tried to dominate the region. 129
Americans' focus on diplomatic solutions failed to provide funding for its favored
pipeline. The increase in Chinese and French involvement further complicated the
financial side of the issue. The European Union's increased involvement in the recent
years created a weaker U.S. image in the economic picture. 130 Today the EU even advises
on the Azeri economy. 131 And the U.S. efforts in the region will now be hampered by
127 As and example the market value of Azerbaijani projected oil exports for this year is $2.2
billion. According to the World Bank, Azerbaijan's total GDP amounts to only $3.9 billion. Ibid.
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
130 Because regional economies are weak, their initiatives are of minor importance for the
investors. These are also markets as well as investment opportunities. The west has a common interest in the
region but Europe is also a rival for American companies in the region. In British Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (FCO) Minister of State, Keith Vaz said "The region has taken on new importance
for the EU over the last year with the entry into force of Partnership and Co-operation agreements with most
of the states of the region.... For example there are around 100 British companies with offices in
Baku...."In his words "...the UK and the EU have taken a different view from the U.S. on pipelines." With
this difference, he emphasizes financial motivation as a desired objective other than political purposes. But
this position does not necessarily make the U.S. unsuccessful. In accord with this thesis' argument, the point
is that if the U.S. had taken a more active position to use its economical initiatives it would have guaranteed
its political goals.
131
"One of the most successful [assistance is] advisors, including an official from HM Treasury,
to the office of the Minister of Azerbaijan, to help [Azeri Minister of Economy] reform the Ministry and
advise on sound fiscal policies." Speech by FCO Minister Keith Vaz, "Political and Economic Prospects in
the Caspian Sea Region," Wilton Park Conference, (England, 9 March 2000) personal correspondence with
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these economic set backs as well. The U.S. has failed so far to produce adequate
responses to these needs.
In fact these policy restraints are results of the former policies' side effects.
According to Frederick Starr:
Under both Bush and Clinton administrations, policy toward this region
has been largely derivative of other U.S. objectives, above all the desire to
support the political and economic development of the new Russia and the
concern to isolate the Islamic Republic of Iran. 132
According to him, U.S. decision-makers always assumed that Russia's economic
development and democratic transition must have priority. In his views the U.S.
government woefully ignored these people. "Somehow, these peoples were still deemed
less worthy of American solicitude than the Baits, let alone Central Europeans." 133
Furthermore the United States has tied its own hands by taking sides in the festering
dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan. A revision and the consent of U.S. in
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty also legitimized the amount of Russian
forces used for Russian interests in the Caucasus. Moreover the U.S. attitude to consider
Russian pipelines preferable to Iranian ones also damaged its policy alternatives. 134
While the Clinton administration intensified its lobbying in different countries, it paid
little attention to the power of financial institutions and investors. "If the U.S. placed so
much strategic value in the construction of Baku-Ceyhan, it should have offered greater
incentives for the oil companies." 135 It also miscalculated the target of this lobbying
policy. A conciliatory midway between institutions could not be established, the United
States could also have made more effort to convince Turkey to make concessions in the
Dien Ginn, Executive Assistant to Roger Williams and Wilton Park. General information about the
conference is available from http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk;
132 Frederick S. Starr, "Power Failure: American Policy in the Caspian."
133 Ibid.
134 Ibid. According to Starr, in fact the U.S. might have had a bargaining instrument if it had done
just the opposite.
135 Jofi Joseph, "Pipeline Diplomacy."
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construction costs. From time to time, the U.S. lost its perspective on the larger interests
while belaboring the minor issues because of its belated reactions and general policy
biases. 136 The United States also undermined the importance of Turkey. "As a NATO
ally, Turkey is an important partner for the U.S. and European influence in the region.
U.S. policy has devoted too little attention to this opportunity." 137 Congress has paid little
attention to this position. There were even arguments that American commitment to
bolster Turkey and Caspian states is not helpful to U.S. interests. 138 United States' failure
to help Turkey become a strong regional power also implied a wariness about whether a
stronger Turkey, "able to act as an independent regional force would necessarily regularly
behave in ways that enhance U.S. interests." 139
When compared with the current conditions of the region and its politico-
economic objectives, the United States did not take into account the specific features
identified in the previous chapters. When it pursued some of these objectives, it did not
carry out the policies effectively because the initial had an impact on the other phases.
Sometimes policies are subordinated to different understandings of the national interests,
like the importance given to the stability of Russia, or focused on ineffective factors like
personal relations. Legislative issues became captive to domestic lobbies like American-
Armenians and oil multinationals. In fact the United States did not understand its true
national interests in the region at the beginning. It understood it had the right goals but
136 Frederick S. Starr, "Power Failure: American Policy in the Caspian."
137 William E. Odom, "U.S. Policy toward Central Asia and the South Caucasus," Caspian
Crossroads Magazine, electronic edition; available from http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/
usazerb/3 1 1 .htm; Internet; accessed 28 November 1999.
138 Mortimer B. Zuckerman, "The Big Game Gets Bigger." Some of the reasons cover the
limitations in U.S. resources available for helping Turkey, concerns about Turkey's human rights reports,
Turkey's relations with Greece, its Cyprus policy, and policy toward northern Iraq, according to Alan
Makovsky.
139 These terms were used as an argument for general Turkish American relations in Makovsky's
words. This thesis argues that the same approach has a big effect on U.S. policies toward Turkey's Caspian
diplomacy. Quotation in Alan Makovsky, "The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy," SAIS Review,
(Winter-Spring 1999), The Washington Institute for Near East Policy; [on-line]; available from
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/alansais.htm; Internet; accessed 22 April 2000.
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has chosen ineffective means to attain them. When the other players participated more
actively and changed the financial aspect of the pipeline policies, 140 the U.S. government
with confused priorities and changing policies, tried to accommodate the situation.
Financial institutions' circumstances coincided with the U.S. desire to increase its
influence in the Balkan region. This initiated a move in favor of a Trans-Balkan pipeline.
Because of the low oil prices and hardships originating from the regional countries'
economic weaknesses, greater interests were subordinated to economic motives.
The United States could and should have played a more effective role in
developing the Caspian basin's energy resources. Clearly, in one way or the other, the
United States has had an interest in the region and this interest is still there. As one
knowledgeable National Security Council source expresses:
We do have an interest in a future where the newly-independent states in
the Caucasus and Central Asia enjoy increased prosperity and a durable
and secure independence. Oil is a means to that end. It is not an end in
itself, nor... it is a guarantor of a country's widespread prosperity and
stability. 141
But consistent policies may serve this purpose. Without a coherent policy toward the
region, a comprehensive plan that binds political, economic and security considerations,
we can expect many more problems in the future. Although this paper advocates that
there is a policy with many problems in U.S. decision making, it also acknowledges the
truth to Frederick Starr's comments: " To be blunt, there is still no strategy. Instead there
is mix of policies on pipelines, on security, on Russia, on Iran, on Turkey that add up, sort
of, to a Caspian policy." 142
140
It is obvious that there is specific amount of oil in the region. In order for any pipeline to be
financially feasible number of pipelines must be kept to a minimum. With the recent enlargement in Baku-
Supsa, if built with the construction of Iranian route, other pipelines will suffer more from the competition.
The cost of the Baku-Ceyhan is already higher than the former two. Under these circumstances, until further
development (like an increase in the amount of proven reserves), it seems that new projects will face more
resistance from oil companies.
141 Quoted in James Kitfield, "Starts and Stripes on the Silk Route," NationalJournal, Vol.31, (13
March 1999): 676-768 [periodical on-line]; available from ABI Information Services (NPS domain)
http://proquest.umi.com; accessed 2 December 1999.
142 Quoted in Paul Starobin, "The New Great Game."
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IV. TURKISH INTERESTS AND POLICIES
Turkish interests and policies in the Caspian region developed after the collapse of
the Soviet Union. The demise of the Union significantly effected Turkey's geopolitical
environment. The Cold War was over and new Trans-Caucasian states with the Caspian
littorals were enjoying the privileges of sovereignty for the first time after decades of
Russian hegemony. For the first time in almost three centuries, Russia and Turkey did not
have common land borders. At least for a period of time Russia left its constituent states
to their own destinies and the general tendency leaned toward a peaceful coexistence in a
modem world. The end of the Cold War, or freedom of some of the constituent states,
however, could not end the danger of conflict in the region. With the emergence of new
economic competition and the renewal of military assertiveness by Russia in the Caspian
Basin, Turkey assumed different pragmatic foreign policy goals.
A. TURKISH INTERESTS AND POLICIES
Starting from the country's foundation, Turkish policies in the Caucasus
developed as a subordinate part of its general foreign policy. "Ever since its establishment
in 1923, the Republic of Turkey has consistently pursued a foreign policy aimed at
international peace based on the principle of 'peace at home and peace in the world' laid
by the republic's founding father and first president, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk." 143
Successive governments appropriately followed this principle to maintain peace inside
and outside the borders of the country that was tired of centuries of long wars. "After the
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the Republic of Turkey needed the time and means to
restore itself." 144 From 1923 to early 1980s policies mostly had an insular and passive
appearance, with no apparent interest in Turkic or Caucasian populations. Much of the
143
"Xhe Goals and Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy," Ministry ofForeign Affairs, Republic of
Turkey; available from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupe/ern/01.htrn; Internet; accessed 22 April 2000.
144 Mehmet Tutuncu, "Turkey's Foreign Policy in the Caucasus," Turkistan Newsletter, (4
November 1997), SOTA Research Center for Turkestan, Azerbaijan, Crimea, Caucasus and Siberia; [on-
line]; available from http://www.turkiys.net/sota/sota.html; Internet; accessed 8 December 1999.
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Turkish foreign policy was based on the situation of the Cold War. "Turkey focused its
energy on internal development and sought to avoid foreign tensions that could divert it
from that goal." 145 It "was a status quo power par excellence. It neither wanted change
nor did it seek it... With its efforts to liberalize its economy and to move from an import-
substitution to an export-led economy in the early 1980s...Ankara navigated effectively
through some of the regional conflicts close to its borders." 146 Between 1980 and 1986 a
consolidation of state policies became the significant feature of this period. "Turkey
undertook major reforms to open its economy, moving from statism and autochthony
toward private initiative and export orientation...and has averaged more than 5 percent
real growth per annum." 147 It was this period that growth in economy and increase in
energy consumption brought forward the importance of new energy resources with new
markets around the country. 148 "Entrepreneurial success and growing prosperity have
distinguished Turkey from many of its Third World neighbors, imbuing the Turkish elite
with a sense of genuine accomplishment and self confidence." 149 This was also a reason
to step forward in a new direction in Turkish policies. 150 In later years Turkey's policies
145 Alan Makovsky, "The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy."
146 Philip Robins, "Turkish Foreign Policy," Madeleine Feher European Scholar Program
Conference, [on-line]; available from http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/books/mfa3.html; Internet; accessed
22 April 2000.
147 Alan Makovsky, "The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy."
148 Turkey needs confirmed and secure energy supplies. "This need is increased since Ankara
closed the two pipelines that came from Iraq... as a result of Turkey's cooperation with the American led
Allied effort in their war against Iraq in 1991." (Robert Olson) Turkish oil consumption is constantly
increasing because of its economic growth and oil provides nearly half of Turkey's total energy
requirements. Around 90% of Turkey's oil supplies are imported from Gulf countries. North Africa and
some from Russia. "Turkey," Country Analysis Brief, August 1999, U.S. Energy Information
Administration [report on-line]; available from http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/turkey.html; Internet;
accessed 20 November 1999.
149 Alan Makovsky, "The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy."
150 According to Alan Makovsky, "the reasons for Turkey's greater assertiveness [in the last
decade] are various and overlapping. More prosperity; a better equipped and more experienced military; the
decline of neighboring states; greater regional opportunity and a greater sense of policy independence
marked by the ending of restraints imposed by the Cold War." These reasons may also help understand
Turkey's new activism.
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in the region saw different phases, 151 which were the outcomes of different dynamics and
motivations.
The period between 1986 and 1991 coincided with Mr. Turgut Ozal's prime
ministry between 1983 and 1989 and his presidency between 1989 and 1993. This period
was most closely identified with Turgut Ozal 152 and in some views he was regarded as
the initiator of an active foreign policy toward the region. 153 Although general foreign
policy direction of Turkish Republic has been immune to personal or organizational
changes, 154 it is obvious that changes in authoritative positions may affect specific issues
cosiderably. Other than Ozal, there were reasons to initiate active policies toward
Caucasus and Central Asia. The European Community's rejection of Turkey's 1987
application for membership has led to conjecture about alternative policies in the
region. 155 Turkey having failed to receive admission to the western club looked for means
151 The phases of Turkish foreign policy between 1986 and 1994 are adapted from Philip Robin's
theoretical analysis of Turkish foreign policy and applied to the Caspian politics because of its relevance to
the subject. In his original analysis he categorizes these phases into three time periods 1986-1991, 1991-
1994 and after 1994. This work uses his three phases while adding two earlier and one later phase to the
analysis.
152 Philip Robins, "Turkish Foreign Policy."
153 According to Philip Robins "he was widely regarded, as having transformed the policymaking
context in Turkey." In his views "Ozal was particularly adept at being able to spot good opportunities and,
in moving quickly and with purpose, well able to exploit them." According to Alan Makovsky "Ozal was
convinced that Turkey had achieved a new stage in its development, one that allowed it to assume a more
forceful position in the region and the world." In Robins' views he also "came increasingly to dominate
civilian politics" and "was the key figure in charting Turkey's future direction." But this had two main
drawbacks according to him. "His intuitive and sometimes impulsive decisions, unleavened by bureaucratic
checks and balances, meant that when he was wrong the consequences were often more serious than if
Turkey had been pursuing a more traditionally cautious foreign policy.... Second, Ozal's personal approach
to foreign relations began to undermine the rule based system that make bureaucracies, and especially
diplomatic services, run smoothly and effectively."
154 In the Turkish State tradition, policies of state and government may have distinctions. The
nation's interests dealing with highly important issues are built on more precise assessments and do not
change too much with the government changes. They also show a trend of continuity. Govemments-on the
other hand can pursue different ways to attain-their policy objectives, which mostly coincide with the
state's objectives.
155 Philip Robins, "Between Sentiment and Self-interest: Turkey's Policy toward Azerbaijan and
the Central Asian States," Middle East Journal, Vol.47, No. 4 (autumn 1993): 595.
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that it could attain by itself. A meaningful policy of "positive neutrality" both in general
terms and in particular relations with the Soviet Union (including the Turkic republics)
was conducted. Because the negotiations between Baku and the western oil companies
started almost in 1990, 156 Turkey also wanted to take its part in these deals without losing
time. Economic interdependence was the driving motive in stabilizing and softening the
difficulties emerged because of the Cold War. 157 In this period, after long years of
hesitation, some kind of mutual opportunity to build relations became possible in the
region. Turkey's, as well as other former Soviet republics' relations, were based on the
principles laid out in this era. As a result of positive neutrality, achievements were made
but because of the realities of the Cold War, the success of relations stayed at a limited
level.
With the government change as a result of the general elections in 1991, foreign
policy changed hands in the Turkish political structure. This period coincided with vast
transformations in the region's structures. "Unlike many other members of the anti-Soviet
alliance, Turkey has not emerged from the Cold War with a sense of enhanced
security." 158 Because of the crises, conflicts and geopolitical changes around the country,
policies were generally cautious. In this phase between 1991 and 1994, educated
bureaucrats managed foreign policy by re-institutionalizing the foreign affairs. 159 With
the idea that "Turkey should not act alone, but jointly with other countries, and preferably
its allies, under proper international auspices...Turkey emerged as a weighty force for
stability and continuity during the most turbulent period of the post Cold War systematic
transition." 160 In this phase Turkey looked west and particularly to the other side of the
156 Suha Bolukbasi, "The Controversy over the Caspian Sea Mineral Resources: Conflicting
Perceptions, Clashing Interests."
157 Philip Robins, "Turkish Foreign Policy."
158 Malik Mufti, "Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy," The Middle East Journal, Vol.
52, No.l, (winter 1998): 32-50 [on-line]; available from ABI Information Services (NPS domain)
http://proquest.umi.com; accessed 20 November 1999.
159 Philip Robins calls this period, "Collegiate Bureaucratic Approach," Ibid.
160 Ibid.
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Atlantic in its projects in the Caspian region. With the demise of the Soviet Union,
Turkey was the first country to recognize these new states. 161 As a country that has "a
highly ideological view of itself and the world, Turkey [developed] a strong sense of
vision" 162 for the newly-independent states. "According to this vision, the republics
should emerge as essentially independent, secular, and democratic, with liberal, free
market-oriented economies. Turkey believed that these are characteristics it possesses and
that it, therefore should be regarded as an economic and political model for these newly-
emerged states." 163 With the beginning of this phase Turkey started intensive cooperation
with the Caucasus and Asian Turkish republics in the spheres of politics, economy,
military, culture and education. This was a "constructive engagement." 164 Georgia,
Ukraine and Azerbaijan with the other Caspian Turkic republics shared the wariness of
Russia's volatile strength. For this reason, they responded to Turkey's initiatives in a
positive way. High level diplomatic traffic has tended to be regular and cordial between
Turkey and these countries. In 1992 and 1993, the Turkish public was shocked by
reported massacres of Azeris by Armenian militias. "When in May 1992, Armenian
attacks were reported on the Azeri enclave of Nakhichevan," according to foreign
analysts "even the possibility of Turkish military intervention was seriously discussed in
Ankara." 165 According to some, this was one of the first demonstrations of a new Turkish
policy. Although these allegations remained rumors, Turkey's position was interpreted
negatively by Armenia, Russia and Iran. It was also in this period that because of the
significant increase in the number of tankers passing through the Turkish straits and the
accidents related to this, Turkey adopted new regulations restricting the access of oil
161 MFA, the Republic of Turkey.
162 Philip Robins, "Between Sentiment and Self-interest," 600.
163 Ibid.
164 Philip Robins, "Turkish Foreign Policy."
165 Freddy DePauw, Turkey's Policies in Transcaucasia, in Contested Borders in the Caucasus.
(BE: VUB University Press, 1996), Ch.VIII [book on-line]; available from http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/
ContBorders/eng/ch0801.htrn; Internet; accessed 14 February 2000
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tankers through the Turkish straits. As a consequence of active policies, Russia and Iran
both tried to block Turkish initiatives, but they also tried to maintain their trade with
Turkey. Economic relations between Russia and Turkey became the balancing factor in
the worries of both sides. Because both sides' trade level far exceeded the other republics,
they always kept their policies on a sufficient level to avoid a face-to-face confrontation.
When the political atmosphere in 1994 changed, the Turkish Foreign Ministry
changed hands again. With the 1995 general elections, which failed to give a clear-cut
victory for any single party, an era of short-lived coalition governments emerged. 166 This
also "resulted in a large turnover in foreign ministries." Because of this "Turkey had as
many as eight foreign ministers between July 1994 and June 1996." 167 Likewise the
energy ministers also changed in this period. Career diplomats were able to maintain the
continuity of foreign policy, but this quick change in ministerial duties prevented the
implementation of an effective policy toward the region. The Caucasus was still the
window to Central Asia 168 and the special importance to the protection of the
independence; sovereignty and territorial integrity of the countries in this area, along with
stability and peace were the necessary preconditions to profit from these relations. Even
though the governments' efficiency decreased because of the changes, they tried to pursue
the same priorities. With little or no credit available, Turkish diplomacy has quickly
exploited some of the opportunities. In Ankara's policies "if Turkey could provide an
infrastructural skeleton that connects it with these new states, then Ankara would have
succeeded in locking these entities into an intimate and long-term relationship." 169
Pipeline projects were just fitting this template and those were the best opportunities for
the countries of the region. Although Turkey was looking westward by all means, these
166
"Weak, fragmented, competitive approach" in Robins.
167 Philip Robins, "Turkish Foreign Policy."
168
"Ismail Cem Stresses wide-angle Foreign Policy Approach," Turkish Daily News, (Ankara, 19
July 1997); [on-line]; available from http://www.access.ch/ruerkei/GRUPF/IC/Dbbasing.htm; Internet;
accessed 22 April 2000.
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countries were a direct energy supply. In addition, the government realized Turkey would
benefit from engineering, consultancy, construction businesses and transit fees at the end.
If a structural skeleton were built, this relationship would also help develop the Turkish
economy. 170
When the AIOC began its deliberations regarding the route of the early oil,
Ankara began a forceful lobbying effort to accept the 926-kilometer Baku-
Batumi route. 171 ... The Turks expected that if the Georgian route were
accepted for early oil, in the long run Turkey could construct a pipeline
from Batumi to Ceyhan to serve as the major pipeline to export a
significant portion of the Azeri crude oil. 172
Ankara even suggested constructing this pipeline offering preferential credits with low
interest rates. The Turkish treasury would be backing this offer with political risk
guarantees. 173 In this period Turkey's relations with the European Union developed
slightly. Contrary to its intense efforts in the northern and eastern direction, Turkey's
main priorities were fixed on a western orientation.
In the second half of 1997, the Turkish foreign ministry changed hands again. Just
after Foreign Minister Ismail Cem's ascendancy, European Union rejected Turkey's long-
standing desire to become an EU member just as 1987. The popular distaste and
uneasiness about the EU's attitude surfaced in a new assertiveness in Turkish Foreign
Policy in other directions. In a conference about "Turkey and the World in 2010-2020,"
Turkish Foreign Minister said, "Turkey will seek a pivotal economic and political role in
Eurasia." He also added:
We want to be a part of the EU, but our target is much broader. The
Balkans, Central Asian and Caucasian countries are launching efforts to
170 Ibid., 605.
171 This option was not among the proposed pipelines. There was an old Russian pipeline between
Baku and Batumi. This pipeline needed an extension and some renewal to be operational. If they accepted
this pipeline, which was closer to the Turkish border, pipeline consortiums would accept the first part of
Turkish proposal.
172 Suha Bolukbasi, "The Controversy over the Caspian Sea Mineral Resources."
173 Ibid.
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open their economies to the world, and Turkey has entered into a new
cooperation with these countries as an indispensable partner. 174
With this event, Turkish policies in the region revived some motivation. President
Suleyman Demirel also made an extra effort to conduct effective policies in the region.
Consultations with both oil investors and regional countries about the cost,
intergovernmental agreements and other issues were carried into a continuous bargaining
status. Bilateral negotiations with the responsible authorities in the U.S. government
began to be frequent because of the importance of U.S. involvement in the region. But
these initiatives and Turkey's attempts to play a significant role in the production and
export of the Caspian oil seemed to have been stalled by Moscow. 175 With the lack of
attainable U.S. support in concluding the final agreements, Turkey was left alone in its
regional pipeline diplomacy. It was also during this period that deterioration in Turkey's
economic growth and investment capability, which had started in the earlier phase,
reached a peak. Turkey's inherent economical restraints and the changing nature of
regional policies limited Turkey's achievements. Turkey considering the region's realities
and being aware of it economic capabilities initiated a policy to build a Caucasian
Stability Pact in 1999. 176 When the year 2000 came, with the change in U.S. attitude and
other regional countries' active economic initiatives for more economically feasible
options, Turkey's pipeline policies lost significant power.
In spite of serving as a balancing factor for the peace and stability of the region
with its precise policies, Turkey could not convince lenders and investors about its
project. Turkey's hopes for the region and its goals for the future of Caspian remain as an
174 Ismail Cem, "Turkey and the World in 2010-2020," quoted in Jolyon Naegele, "Turkey:
Foreign Policy Plan Aims for Pivotal Role in Eurasia," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 13 August 1999;
[on-line]; available from http://www.rferl.Org/nca/features/1998/08/F.RU.9808 13 12 1643.html; Internet;
accessed 22 April 2000.
175 In this period both Russia and Iran have launched an antagonistic campaign about the legal
status of Caspian sea, in order not to give way to exploitation of Caspian resources without their consent.
Because Turkey was not a littoral state to the Caspian Sea it could not be involved in the issue directly and
Ankara played a low-key role in the controversy.
176 This pact did not reach its final form yet, and Turkey needs popular support from the
international community.
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important part of its current policies. With pipelines or without them, the region's
importance persists according to Turkish decision-makers.
There are several opinions about the success of Turkish policies in the region.
Some of those see Turkey's policies not more than rhetoric. 177 Others evaluate the current
situation more cautiously and assert that Turkey's success was not so bad. In fact
throughout its implementation, the Turkish foreign policy included a wide scope of
imaginative diplomatic initiatives. According to Alan Makovsky Ankara's policies were
far from venturesome. Turkey was using diplomacy and multilateralism to promote
stability and prosperity in the realm of diplomatic initiative with a measured activism. 178
In general the MFA has followed the principles of non-interference concerning other
countries' internal affairs and territorial integrity and favored maintaining reasonably
good relations with Russia. 179 Turkey also performed a delicate balancing act in its
relations between Russia and its friendly neighbors. In some ways business ties became
more effective than political relations did. Turkey became more concerned with the
Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict than the other countries. Ankara allotted $1.5 billion to
NIS and above $7 billion worth of projects have been undertaken by more than 400 major
Turkish companies. More than 10,000 scholarship and training opportunities were
given. 180 Students from these countries were trained in Turkish military colleges in order
177 Prof. Huseyin Bagci criticizes Turkish policies as such, "expecting the wonderful rhetoric we
have been witness to over the last decade, Turkish foreign policy toward those countries is also far from
being a success." He also expects a decline in the efficiency of Caspian policies in the near future.
According to him, President Demirel's retirement before the second half of 2000 would leave Turkey's
Caspian policy weaker. Considering the diplomacy carried out by Demirel for the last couple of years he
suspects a decline in efficiency of policies in the transition period. In "Energy Policy or Politics of
Slogans."
178 Alan Makovsky, "The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy."
179 Gareth M. Winrow, "Turkey and the Newly-Independent States of Central Asia and the
Caucasus, " Middle East Review ofInternational Affairs, Vol. 1, No.2, (July 1997) [on-line]; available from
http://www.biu.ac.il/soc/besa/meria/journal/1997/issue2/jvln2a5. html; Internet; accessed 7 February 2000.
180 figures are taken from MFA Republic of Turkey web site.
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to adapt them to western systems and practices. 181 Transport and communication was
also an important factor to satisfy mutual interests. In January 1992 a Turkish
International Cooperation Agency (TICA) was established to coordinate and direct the
assistance provided by Turkey more effectively. 182 Turkey even opened its satellite
communication channels to these countries in order for them to reach the rest of the world
more easily. Turkey supported GUAM and sponsored PfP programs as well as Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council attendance of these countries. With the increasing number of
relations a good base for mutual understanding in the region successfully developed.
Turkey tried to transform its "national interests" into "regional interests." 183 It has coped
much less well with the rapid normative changes, which have accompanied the end of the
Cold War. Turkey achieved many of its first steps in a volatile environment without
damaging its relations and causing major tension. These all took place in only less than
ten years. Of course none of these initiatives brought about the construction of the Baku-
Ceyhan pipeline or any other pipelines passing through Turkey. Turkey's policies fell
short of pipeline objectives.
In fact when these states became independent, Turkey was caught without enough
knowledge about the real situation or prepared plans to deal with these issues. According
to Suha Bolukbasi, Turkey's initiatives toward Trans-Caucasus have also been low-key
because of traditional cautious diplomacy and relatively modest short-term goals. 184
Another reason for Turkey's limited success was too many other foreign policy
objectives. The economic and political benefits of joining Europe far outweighed the
benefits of focusing all attention on the problematic Caspian region. One important factor
181 Gen. Cevik Bir, "Turkey's Role in the New World Order, New Challenges" Strategic Forum,
No.135, (February 1998), [on-line]; available from http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforunVforuml35.html;
Internet; accessed 25 February 2000.
182
"Relations with the Central Asian Republics," MFA Republic of Turkey.
183 Busra Ersanli, "Rediscovering Multidimensionality, Turkey's Search for Cooperation with
Turkic Republics" in Alaeddin Yalcinkaya, Turkic Republics and Oil Pipelines (Istanbul: Baglam
Yayinlari, 1998), 231. (Turkish)
184 Suha Bolukbasi, "Ankara's Baku-Centered Policy: Has it Failed?"
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also added up to the current situation. Turkey did not have a desire to control the
pipelines in the region. 185 The weaknesses in the transition periods became the reflections
of frequently changing governments in the country. Regional countries' politico-
economic weaknesses restrained policies considerably. The Newly-Independent States'
military, infrastructural and linguistic ties with Moscow also effected the implementation
of a successful policy. According to Lowell A. Bezemis, these countries also did not have
strong demands for change 186 and this added up to the difficulties the Turkish
government faced implementing its policies. Neither Turkey nor regional states wanted
to confront Russia in a direct way. The projects' magnitude and lack of sufficient
investment funds in the Turkish economy forced Turkey to look for foreign investment.
Turkey also gave higher priority to the interstate diplomacy than effective bargaining with
oil multinationals. The importance given to the ethics and good will in relations with the
neighbors worked for the other rivals who did not care much about the same criteria.
When the support for the Baku-Batumi early oil pipeline did not give results, Turkey lost
its first hold. With this event policy efficiency was limited to other projects, which were
supported by other interest groups. Turkey's failure to give more concessions and proper
economic guarantees for the management of projects because of its limited financial
capabilities also resulted in a decline from its proposed pipeline by investors.
In general, Turkey understood the problems and the ways to solve them in a
proper way. Almost in every situation it took into account the special features of the
region and used them in its assessments. It has laid out the groundwork and defined its
priorities properly. Ankara managed to control the general direction of its policy toward
the region but failed to succeed in specific projects because of its economic capabilities
and failure to proceed toward the same goals with the same government bodies. Its
policies toward the region fit into its national interest but because of higher interests some
of them were subordinated to different preferences in specific periods. Because of its
185 Dincer Tascikar, "Economic Reforms in Central Asia and the New Great Game," in Alaeddin
Yalcinkaya, 242.
186 Robert Olson, "Turkish and Russian Foreign Policies."
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commitment to regional countries' interests, Turkey's maneuvers in the region were
limited to a few options. 187 The failure in predicting the further moves of other players in
specific times forced Turkey to follow a path drawn by other initiatives. Turkey had the
right goals, and it also has chosen the means that would work, but it needed persistent
support to attain it. It proposed and maintained its goals but could not use its means to
lobby in favor of its proposal in the U.S. or the EU. Undermining the importance of
lobbying activities in these countries resulted in the form of indirect barriers to pipelines.
It could not correct the false presumptions about its intentions in the region. It also could
not convince the international community about the importance of Baku-Ceyhan that
would help free the regions' weak states from powerful non-western hegemons. Turkey's
main orientation in the western direction left some of its initiatives comparably weaker in
the Caspian issues.
Although a final decision about the pipelines has not been made, considering
Turkey's potential to pursue its objectives and financial institutions' reluctance to invest
at least in the near future, one can still see a lot of changes coming in the years ahead.
B. TURKEY'S PROBLEMS WITH RUSSIA, PROPOSED PIPELINES AND
POLICIES
Turkey could not attain its proposed pipeline yet. Furthermore, in spite of
following a balanced policy between its interests and relations with its neighbors, being
active in regional politics, and bargaining with oil multinationals, raised some questions
about the Turkish activities in the region. Even the internationally recognized procedures
to control the navigation through the straits faced severe criticism from Russia. Because
the sellers of this oil are multinational companies, these companies supported by their
respective governments may also become strong advocates in the argument, adding to
Turkey's difficulties.
187 According to most of the Turkish policy-makers the idea that the Turkish pipeline would earn
Turkey hard currency in royalties was secondary to this geopolitical and critical calculation.
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One of the main criticisms of Turkey's Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline has been the
safety of this route. Oil investors and countries backing these companies tended to see
Turkey's terrorism problem as similar to that of Russia's Chechen war continuing for
almost a decade. Failing to see the details and the magnitude of these two issues may lead
analysts to a superficial but inaccurate evaluation of the subject. Politically comparing the
two problems is not valid for several reasons. First of all, Russia's war with Chechenya is
a war between two states with their own elected governments; one in which the supreme
entity battles one of its autonomous republics. Because of this war not only oil pipelines
but almost the entire infrastructure is being destroyed in the region. 188 Analysts clearly
define this campaign as a full-scale war. Spread over a large area and concerning
supranational bodies like UN and OSCE, Russia's campaign is a much different situation
than Turkey's. Even though there are some differences in the understandings between the
West and Turkey, in Turkey, the state is dealing with an internationally recognized
terrorist organization, 189 which targets both state apparatus and local residents. A
comparison of both problems is not applicable because a truthful comparison shows how
far Russia's Chechen problem exceeds those of Turkey's. 190 The terrorist organization,
PKK, had employed brutal tactics against civilians and small units of security forces.
188
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With the capture of the terrorist organization's leader, Abdullah Ocalan, and Turkey's
socio-economic, military and educational efforts toward solving this problem, a
considerable decrease in terrorist activities has been observed recently. According to
some foreign analysts, Turkey has taken a big step in solving its terrorism problem. 191
Even if it persists in the future, this problem would not have a significant impact on the
pipelines for several reasons. First, according to John Roberts, "Contrary to many
assumptions, oil pipelines and their associated infrastructure are not vulnerable to terrorist
attack. To be sure pipelines are impossible to defend but they are relatively cheap and
easy to repair." 192 According to him protecting critical pumping stations and control units
helps maintain the operation of pipelines. Although he does not explain the effect of full-
scale war, Chechenya and Daghestan examples probably give a legible precedent for
evaluations. The difference obviously lies in the scale of a terrorist attack or a full-scale
warfare, which effects everything. Secondly, Turkey's two current oil pipelines are a good
example of the safety of lines in this region. These pipelines, coming from northern Iraq
pass through this so-called "unsafe" route for 23 years. 193 They travel along Turkish-Iraqi
and Turkish-Syrian borders and terminate in Ceyhan. For the last 23 years only one
significant interruption occurred in these pipelines. Any significant interruption or
damage other than this could not be recorded because of terrorist activity.
Other issues restrained Turkey's relations with Russia as well. Russia worsened
the situation over the pipelines by playing the Kurdish card against Turkey several times
in the last decade. In February and October of 1994, the Kurdish National Liberation
Front (ERNK), which is a branch of PKK, received tolerance in its activities from
Moscow. In October and November of 1995, so called the Kurdish Assembly held
191
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sessions in one of Moscow's official Parliament buildings. 194 Despite official Turkish
protests, these kinds of activities lasted in different forms until the capture of Ocalan and
just before his capture he visited Russia for a third time. 195 For their part Russians blame
Turkey for having a role in the Chechen trouble. In reality Moscow uses these tools to
justify its means to block Turkish efficiency in the region.
Russia protested when Turkey introduced its new regulations in the Turkish
Straits. The Bosphorus is an especially extraordinary waterway. It is one of the world's
busiest waterways handling some 45,000 major ships annually. According to official
reports this constitutes three times that of the Suez Canal and does not include 13,000
local ships, boats or other sea vehicles travelling between the sides of the Bosphorus.
Turkey's biggest city, Istanbul, with roughly 12 million people is situated around the
Bosphorus. With less than one-half mile (700 meters) distance at the narrowest point, the
Bosphorus requires ships to change course at least twelve times, including four separate
bends at more than 45 degree turns. There are also powerful and rapid currents, which
frequently drag ships off course. Under the Montreaux Convention (1936), the
Bosphorus is open to all merchant ships of all nations. Unlike other comparable
waterways, reporting on cargo contents is voluntary even with regard to hazardous cargo
including nuclear, flammable and toxic waste and no other shipping waterway operates in
such a manner. 196 Considering the EU mandates, which do not even let tankers come any
closer to their shores than 20 miles and stricter regulations in the U.S. 197 Turkey's
concerns can be understood easily. With the 167 large-scale accidents because of
194 Suha Bolukbasi, "The Controversy over the Caspian Sea Mineral Resources."
195 News related to Ocalan 's stay in Russia can be found in Turkish Press Review, 3 February
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HTM; Internet; accessed 2 January 2000.
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increased tanker traffic between 1983 and 1993 concerns about the safety of the straits
became a central issue in Turkish life. When in 1994 a Greek Cypriot tanker collided with
another ship, 30 people died. Dispersed oil burnt for five days and closed the straits to
traffic for almost a week. The financial cost of this accident alone was $1 billion. 198 All
these factors forced Turkish statesmen to take the necessary precautions to prevent more
serious accidents resulting in a tragedy in the heart of the city. But even those measures,
which do not restrict but regulate traffic, 199 incited severe opposition from Russia.
According to estimates "the Tengiz output alone, if carried solely by tanker, would triple
the current rate of Bosphorus oil traffic."200 Considering the new regulations and
possibility of accidents, certainly long lines and waiting times in the entrance and exits of
the straits in the future can be expected.
Although Turkey could not convince oil investors that its proposal was
economically feasible, it wants financial institutions to consider the aspects of investing
in the northern route. Turkey "has a modern and state of the art loading and storage
facility"201 in Ceyhan. This infrastructure does not need any additional construction.
Ceyhan can handle the largest tankers in service (800,000 dwt), which are far larger than
the size of tankers that can navigate through the straits. Because of the suitable climate in
the Mediterranean this port operates all year long with easier navigational requirements
than the Black Sea Ports, which endure severe weather conditions. 202 Turkey guaranteed
198 John Daly, "Oil, Guns and Empire: Russia, Turkey, Caspian 'New Oil' and the Montreaux
Convention," U.S.-Azerbaijan Council Web Site, [on-line]; available from http://ourworld.compuserve.com
/homepages/usazerb/325.htm; Internet; accessed 28 November 1999.
199 New regulations are somewhat detailed. Some of them are: ship heights were limited to 190
feet, ships carrying hazardous material were restricted to single passage in daylight time, daylight passage is
required from all ships over 200 meters and favorable weather is required. The UN Maritime Safety
Committee approved most of these regulations in May 1994, Ibid.
200 Ibid.
201
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202 Jack Carter, a senior advisor for International Affairs with the US Department of Energy
describes the physical conditions of Black sea ports discussing the Novorosiisk terminal. "Novorosiisk the
main Russian terminal for the oil there has had some very serious problems. I just saw in the last few days
that extremely high winds had prevented tankers from leaving the port, and the port is frequently closed. So
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the $1.4 billion cost of the pipeline to be built on Turkish soil.203 In case of an additional
finance need, Turkey will provide additional portion of the investment. This guarantee
might have helped Turkey, but it still did not satisfy investors.
Turkey's pragmatic foreign policy goals have not diminished yet. Its policies were
stalled by its own and other players' problems, but attaining many of these objectives is
still possible. Pipelines were an important part of Turkey's policies but other options are
also important. Succeeding in other objectives is easier for Turkey and probably more
attainable without help. But this thesis asserts that other objectives even if totally
achieved would not be as helpful to the regional countries as the pipelines. Without a
pipeline toward Ceyhan, nothing would likely change in the Caspian politics.
even if the oil gets to the Novorosiisk, there does not seem to be a guarantee that the port can physically
handle the flows." Quoted in Jack Carter, "The Great Game: The Struggle for Caspian Oil," Caucasus and
the Caspian Seminar Transcripts, Kennedy School of Government, BCSIA Publications 1996, SDI, [report
on-line]; available from http://ksgnotesl.harvard.edu/BCSIA/Library/ICGreatGame?OpenDocument&
ExpandSection=TheStruggleforCaspian.htm; Internet; accessed 28 February 2000.
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V. ANALYSIS
Turkey and the United States entered the Caspian area almost at the same time.
After their first acquaintances with the new republics they both developed policies which
would attain their interests. Although the commonalties in their understandings resulted
in a rapprochement for cooperation, the difference in interpreting some of the issues, the
ways respective governments work and the drives behind current policies limited their
success in obtaining absolute results. Furthermore their motivation and willingness to
reach their declared policy objectives were crippled by domestic and international
problems. Sometimes one's moves bothered the other.204 They had more common
interests and opportunities for cooperation. They also succeeded in building a mechanism
of general frameworks but they could not maintain the continuity of their initiatives.
A. COMMONALTIES IN U.S. AND TURKISH THINKING AND
COHERENCE WITH THE REGIONAL COUNTRIES' INTERESTS
The United States and Turkey's understandings of the Caspian region developed
in the context of their normal relationship. "Since so much of the U.S.-Turkish
relationship was based on the situation of the Cold War years, their partnership has
undergone important changes in the new era."205 The relationship in the post-Cold War
era developed as mutual interest rather than a mutual cooperation against a common
enemy. The Cold War necessities existed no longer, U.S. and Turkey found their interests
and policies on important matters converging. Both nations clearly understood the
importance of energy security and the geo-economic structure in the region. They had
204 For example when Turkey signed an agreement with Iran to buy a considerable amount of
natural gas in 1997 because of the urgent need in the near future, this disappointed the U.S. Similarly the
United States' unwillingness to give financial support for Baku-Ceyhan and its own companies' willingness
to invest in an Iranian pipeline formed a controversy for the other side. The preferential status given to
Russia and the Balkans also compounded this situation.
205 Kemal Kirisci, "Turkey and the United States: Ambivalent Allies," Middle East Review of
International Affairs, Vol.2, No.4 (November 1998) [on-line]; available from http://www.biu.ac.il/soc/besa/
meria/journal/1998/issue4/jv2n4a3.html; Internet; accessed 7 February 2000.
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also seen the necessity of regional stability to develop new opportunities. Though
unequal, they both realized the need to cooperate in Caspian matters. Significantly they
both were in favor of the emergence of democratic, secular and western oriented regimes.
These ideas also inspired the historic communist governments of the countries. Economic
wealth in the West was more attractive to the region's poor countries than the crumbling
Russian economy. The cooperation would benefit the United States and Turkey as well as
these countries. The secularism was also favored by the newly-independent states.
Because of the policies followed in the former Soviet Union, these countries' approach to
religion had been suspicion. Most citizens were not devoutly religious owing to the
Soviet educational system. Although a possibility of falling into religious fundamentalism
existed, a secular state became more acceptable form of a government for the local elite.
Turkey and the United States shared the policies to build democracies but these policies
were not coherently accepted by the region's lifetime elected autocratic leaders. Peoples
of this region's interests coincided with the Turkish and U.S. interests but differed from
their own leaders'. This situation even undermined the relations with respective
governments.206
Turkey from the beginning of its interactions with the region, United States in
specific periods wanted to prevent the rebuilding of a Russian hegemony. Azerbaijan and
Georgia who were in search of political and economic independence also welcomed these
policies. Kazakhstan acted differently because of its considerable Russian minority and its
military links with the Russian Federation. Politically, Kazakhstan accepted Russia as the
big brethren. Turkmenistan on the other hand developed relations with Iran and
Afghanistan. These countries' physical and cultural proximity to Turkmenistan made it
also easier to build economic relations. This scheme of different preferences weakened
the commonalties in Turkish-U.S. policy making by diverting their focus to different
issues.
206 Last example of this situation can easily be seen in Secretary of State Madeline Albright's
recent tour to Central Asia. Albright's criticism for the lack of democracy in her visit faced with
indifference in attitudes by the regional leaders. This situation worsens the relations with these countries
from both sides. Regional leaders do not want to lose their princely powers and interpret these warnings as
an intervention to domestic politics.
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When Turkey acted as a model for the newly-independent countries, support came from
the United States. The United States even promoted the idea among other countries.
A cooperation between U.S. and Turkey to prevent inter-state and inter-ethnic
conflicts has always been seen in the region. U.S. and Turkish mutual efforts in
consolidation of Azeri-Armenian conflict or the importance given to the unity of Georgia
were the presentation of this common understanding.
"Regarding regional economic development, too, the United States and Turkey
appear[ed] to support similar approaches."207 A part of the United States' multiple
pipelines policy and "east west transportation corridor" also coincided with their own
thinking. Although Baku-Ceyhan route earned political support from the U.S., multiple
pipelines also undermined this line's importance by decreasing the chance of Baku-
Ceyhan.
The environmental and security concerns of Turkish decision-makers were
respected and supported by the Clinton administration. As a result, new regulations were
introduced in the Bosphorus. These regulations received little criticism, except for Russia.
The United States administration made its diplomatic support available for
Turkey's activities in the region. Apart from economic benefits, the stability of the region
became the central issue in most of the policies by both sides. Consent on the U.S.
interests in the region made diplomacy between U.S. and Turkey easier.208
Iran's exclusion from the pipelines helped almost every country politically and
helped Turkey and the regional countries economically. The inroads to Iranian influence
and its role in trying to gain control of one main pipeline were temporarily blocked by
this initiative. In this way a competitor, Iran as an oil and gas producer, was also kept out
of the western oil market rivalries.
The United States' efforts to advise oil companies to invest in preferential
pipelines facilitated Turkey's bargaining with financial institutions. Because oil-
207 Ibid.
208
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were both general and including regional countries interests.
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producing countries declared their preferences for Turkish options, efforts to invest in the
western direction facilitated cooperation. Only realizing the importance of cooperation
could ease the disagreements about Trans-Caspian route.
Both Turkey and the U.S. saw financial aid as an essential means to overcome the
immediate problems of the Caspian States. They allotted their individual aid funds. The
amount of aid changed from country to country and from time to time.
There were also common features in U.S. and Turkish thinking which negatively
effected the construction of favored pipelines. First, neither of them had the necessary
information and expertise when they launched their relations with the region. They were
caught unprepared for the demanding NIS. When new states' appeal for more appropriate
structures was not realized, this also caused unfulfilled expectations. Second, Turkey and
the United States did not want to confront Russia openly. Their hesitation in active
policies and their miscalculation of the Russian capabilities limited their abilities to deal
with Russia. This attitude resulted in the degradation of the available bargaining
diplomacy. Third, the two allies' limited economic means available for restructuring the
region's environment hampered the conditions. Fourth, Turkey and United States'
Caspian policies when compared with other interests fell short of the declared
commitments. The countries, which looked at them enthusiastically at the beginning,
turned to Russian, Chinese and Iranian counterparts because of unfulfilled promises.
Fifth, both of countries were restrained by their domestic political oppositions and
changes in the authoritative government posts. Their operative activities stalled with these
effects and the producers were effected by the changing preferences.
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B. DISAGREEMENTS ABOUT SUBSTANCE OR TACTICS
The United States and Turkey shared many common interests. They have also
shared many common policies but they have faced differences in their approach to the
problems. Some of these disagreements resulted from different attitudes about the nature
of the regional realities. Some of them on the other hand resulted because of the tactics
used by the two allies.
The biggest divergence about pipeline politics emerged when the U.S. gave
Russia much more importance than Turkey did because of America's interests in
geopolitical issues.209 The failure by the U.S. to distinguish pipeline policies from the
general priority given to Russia210 created a distinction between U.S. and Turkish
policies. Although Turkey maintained its economic and diplomatic relations with Russia
on a constant level, in Turkish thinking the regional countries' sovereignty and stability of
the region was always the first priority.
Another difference was the way pipelines were seen by the allies. Turkey has seen
the pipelines as one of the very few realistic ways of freeing these states from any
209 Some of these issues cover NATO enlargement in the eastern direction, NATO intervention in
Kosovo, Strategic Nuclear Balance and Proliferation. ("U.S.-Russian Relations at the Turn of the Century,"
Report of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Working Group on U.S.-Russian Relations.)
Because these concerns held much more importance in U.S. decision making, Russia's stability was seen as
a priority when compared to the regional countries' well being.
210 Andrew Hamilton a former NSC staff member from 1970 to 1971, gives another striking
example of this priority. He argues that recent oil price accelerations can be explained by a desire to help
Russia. He says "in an intriguing comment Bill Bradley made on March 1 during his debate with Al Gore as
a Democratic presidential candidate, ... he declared T think the reason [for soaring energy prices] is
because we more or less asked the OPEC countries to raise oil prices in hopes of helping Russia... develop
its economy.'" In his article he explains this position. " Because of Russia's financial mismanagement and
the suspension of international aid in 1998, the administration had few tools to help the country. However,
Russia exports more than 1 billion barrels of oil a year and 20 percent of its foreign exchange in 1996 came
from oil sales. Restoring a higher price would directly aid the Russian economic recovery." He also gives
more detail about the issue. Andrew Hamilton, "A Look at ...The Cost of Oil," Washington Post, (30 April
2000): B03. According to another report, this price rise helps Russia in different ways. Paul Goble from
Radio Free Liberty reports that "both Russian and western commentators have already noted that Moscow
has been able to finance its war in Chechenya because of these rising oil prices." According to Goble these
increases set a stage for greater independence of action for Russian decision-makers. Paul Goble, "Russia:
Analysis from Washington- Oil Prices and Political Possibilities," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, (3
April 2000) [on-line]; available from http://www.rferl.org/nca/ features/2000/04/ F.RU.00403125259.html;
Internet; accessed 1 1 February 2000.
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power's hegemony. The Turks think the economic viability of the pipelines was always in
secondary place to the significance they carried. Turkey saw its objective as a mission for
ethical values. Achieving its objectives would morally elevate the Turkish mood. The
United States did not see the pipelines as being important as Turkey did. Furthermore, the
United States saw this region as a reward of economic and political benefits for different
rivals.
Probably another important difference was the realist approach Turkey pursued
and the liberal approach the United States followed. Because both policy options had
different benefits and assumptions, respective governments' calculations were based on
dissimilar evaluations. Whenever conditions in the region were suitable for finances, this
helped the United States, whenever conditions permitted Turkey benefited from the
diplomatic situation.
The idea that "the area is too remote from U.S. assets and too politically and
economically backward for Washington to invest the necessary resources"211 differed
from the Turkish opinion. Turks thought that even under the worst circumstances
investment and allocation of assets help countries as well as investor states. There was no
discrimination between the peoples of other countries in Turkish thinking.
The United States' belief that market forces would secure the future of oil
pipelines with the economic well being of states significantly differed from the realities of
the Caspian region. Turkey believed that free trade and economic development might be a
consequence of ending the conflicts. The interdependence between them would only be
realized when the necessary conditions were supplied in Turkey's calculations.
The U.S. understanding of Armenian-Azeri conflict was also different from
Turkey's. A belligerent occupier of 20% of Azeri territory, Armenia was seen as a victim
of Azeri repression in the U.S. Senate. Armenia's collaboration with Iran and Russia also
did not receive enough attention from the United States.
211
"Central Asia Shuns U.S. Hegemony," Stratfor Commentary, (28 April 2000) [on-line];
available from http://www.stratfor.com/CIS/commentary/0004281700.htm; Internet; accessed 28 April
2000.
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United States' sanctioning the Iranian pipelines and accommodation efforts212
between oil companies differed from Turkish thinking. This controversy and the U.S.
distaste for Turkey's natural gas trade with Iran added to the misunderstandings in
regional policies.
Another difference emerged when Turkey accelerated its efforts to end terrorism.
The United States and Turkey mutually interested in building Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline.
During this time, companies have been questioning the security of Turkey's southern
region and the U.S. legislation consequently cut foreign aid to Turkey.213 This reduced
Turkish and U.S. executive branches' ability to proceed in the same direction.
The differences in tactics were more significant than the understandings. America
advocated multiple pipelines including one from Baku to Ceyhan, but this decreased the
possibility of building this line. The U.S. support for multiple pipelines and preference of
an initial Russian branch gave Russia an upper hand in rivalries. Producer countries
projected sending the oil by the most reliable, most feasible means and transporting crude
oil in the shortest time. Multiple pipelines prolonged the time for decision and
construction, undermined the security of different lines, and reduced the feasibility of
transportation. Turks on the other hand supported one route irrespective of commercial or
economical factors. The U.S. preferred early oil pipelines in two directions instead of
Turkey's unidirectional proposal.
212 Sheila Heslin, a former administration official with the National Security Council (NSC),
argues that "while the U.S. government understood the potential negative side-affects of ILSA, it sought to
mitigate these somewhat by allowing for oil swaps through Iran from the Caspian countries." Sheila Heslin,
"Key Constraints to Caspian Pipeline Development: Status, Significance, and Outlook," James A. Baker
Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, (April 1998): 43 quoted in Julia Nanay, "Withering the Oil
Industry? The Fate of the Caspian Hangs in the Balance (The Dilemma of Transport Routes)," SAIS
Review, Vol. 19, No. 1, (1999): 272-281 [on-line]; available from http://muse.jhu.edu/joumals/sais_review/
v019/ 19.1er_heslin.html; Internet; accessed 17 April 2000.
213 According to Kemal Kirisci, Turkey's operations in the southeastern Turkey attracted
congressional and public interest affecting U.S. foreign policy toward Turkey. "This interest translated itself
mto legislation cutting foreign aid to Turkey as well as demanding the Administration prepare reports on the
use of U.S. military equipment in situations of human rights violations. The powerful lobbying capacity of
human rights and arms control groups together with anti-Turkish ethnic lobbies... [resulted in] substantial




The United States ruled out the financial subvention for the proposed pipelines
and focused its attention only on diplomatic efforts while Turkey used its entire means to
construct the pipelines in the region. Although Turkey's capabilities were limited, using
available financial tools to support Baku-Ceyhan became an objective in Turkish tactics.
When negotiations stalled because of multi-layered problems, Turkey even advocated
building its pipeline by itself.214
Because understandings were different, the response to the Armenian-Azeri
conflict was different in U.S. and Turkish policies. While Turkey helped Azeri
reconciliation efforts, U.S. saw benefits in helping Armenia. Both countries applied
sanctions to the other's counterpart.
Turkey used its state-owned pipeline transportation company (BOTAS) to direct
its oil policies in the region but because the United States, as a government, did not own
the companies, their respective policies could not be coherently implemented with the
same tactics. Similarly Turkey easily guaranteed the financial and political aspects of the
Baku-Ceyhan in its unanimously decided policies whereas the United States faced strong
congressional criticism on the specific financial and security issues.
Turkey saw the international organizations like OSCE, ECO, BSEC and UN as
suitable grounds to solve regional problems and used each opportunity to generate
initiatives that could ease these difficulties. Even though some of these saw support from
the United States, the U.S. was mostly interested in bilateral relations and negotiations.
This prevented some of the issues from internationalization. Owing to the similar reasons,
the activities of Russia and the importance of a stable oil regime in the region escaped the
attention of the international community.
The United States and Turkey used different instruments in their policies. Turkey
used its cultural, linguistic and historical relations while dealing with the countries. This
sometimes became an effective instrument in regional relations. The United States on the
other hand relied on personal relationships and large finance institutions. Because the
214 This option probably cannot work without consent of oil executives in a general framework of
complete transportation systems.
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financial institutions approach the problem differently, the government policies were
affected by the financial institutions.
With both similarities and differences in their policies, the two allies cooperated
in many ways. The United States and Turkey started their projects as partners. This
partnership has not changed its initial intention. From the start of this cooperation one's
policy did not purposefully oppose the other's activities. But since the risks they faced,
their ideology and policies differed greatly, they had vast differences in substance and
tactics. Their cooperation in the region when compared with other nations, is still a
meaningful commitment. They still have the opportunities to benefit from the available
conditions and contribute to this atmosphere. But they need to predict the consequences
of their policies.
C. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
Almost a decade has passed after the Caspian littorals declared their
independence. Like other countries that depend on the oil regions, the United States and
Turkey also made efforts. But too little has changed to satisfy the U.S. and Turkey. Worse
than that, the political and economical conditions are still deteriorating. The United States
and Turkey have been following policies built on good will and promising benefits. But
their failure in concluding fruitful policies is undermining the value of region's countries
by falling behind the expectations of both their decision-makers and weak regional
countries.
Since Russia has done everything possible other than military intervention, and
Iran has been benefiting from the international environment, the new era is prone to
deteriorating conditions. The politics of both nations add up to this picture: "Consistent
with its tilt in favor of both Armenia and Russia, the United States turns a deaf ear toward
Azerbaijani complaints."215 If this attitude persists, with its growing economy and army
Azerbaijan may no longer accommodate the Armenian invasion of its soil and a new
conflict in the region could break out.
215 S. Frederick Starr, "Power Failure: American Policy in the Caspian.'
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If Russian assertiveness continues and if it succeeds in Chechenya "the
neocolonial thinkers in Moscow would be encouraged to try to destabilize Georgia, which
is volatile and vulnerable."216 If Georgia falls under the influence of Russia; the pipelines
and the political and economic pluralism of the region would be at stake.217 In case of
unresolved conflicts in the region, Iranian, Armenian and Russian cooperation may take
the shape of a concrete anti-western alliance.
Russian military intervention close to Turkey's borders can ignite regional
conflicts. A confrontation between Russia and Turkey may draw NATO or the EU into a
conflict, which can easily changes the region.218 An event on this scale constitutes a
considerable danger to international security.
In the near future "belated, and to date, ineffective" U.S. support219 for pipeline
routes through Turkey may prove useless. With the growing importance of economic
factors, the governments' ability to conduct oil policies might be more limited. Even if
these pipelines are opened, their capacity would still be so small as to allow only a
modest part of Azerbaijani production. 220 This situation could not help Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan free themselves from former hegemonies.
216 Zbigniew Brzezinski, quoted in Philip Kurata, "Russian Offensive in Chechenya Seen to
Threaten Pipelines," USIS Washington File, (13 December 1999) [on-line]; available from
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/war/1999/12/991213-chechen-usial.htm; Internet; accessed 28 April
2000.
217 Ibid.
218 Zbigniew Brzezinski, drawing a similarity with the Balkans, calls this situation "Eurasian
Balkans." Quoted in Amy Myers Jaffe and Robert A. Manning, "The Myth of the Caspian 'Great Game':
The Real Geopolitics of Energy," Survival (London), Vol. 40, No. 4, (winter 1998/1999): 112-131 [on-
line]; available from ABI Information Services, http://proquest.umi.com; NPS Domain; accessed 25
February 2000.
219 Frederic Starr, "Power Failure: American Policy in the Caspian." Some new progress
developed on the Baku-Ceyhan route, when Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia reached an agreement on the
legal framework of the pipelines on 28 April 2000. However, much effort is needed to achieve the goal.
According to President Clinton, "The next phase would be for companies in the United States, Western
Europe and Russia to work with Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Turkey to transform the legal
documents into a commercial reality."("Deal Reached on Oil Pipelines," New York Times On-line, 28 April
2000.) But as explained, the pipeline may yet not be successful.
220 S. Frederick Starr, "Power Failure: American Policy in the Caspian."
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Iran's pipeline from the Caspian Port of Neka complicates the problems. Iran
maneuvered for new players onto its side and made the EU countries and China oppose
the United States. The influence of the U.S. and Turkey in the Caspian Basin can decline
if these countries increase their presence in Iranian oil affairs. China also perceives the
region as a breeding ground for political chaos. It has no desire to control the region but
wants to benefit from the chronic instability. 221 The Kazak president distancing himself
from the United States, his referral to Iran as an anchor of stability in the region and
seeing Iran as an energy partner gives further clues for the future regional opportunities.
Combined with the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Russia and Chechenya,
region might prove more vulnerable to interventions and fractures in the near future.
If Washington and Ankara continue to fail in their policy objectives, their allies'
(i.e. Israel) interests could also be jeopardized222 . Because of the authoritarian regimes in
Russia and the regional countries, almost every government has been struggling with
numerous problems. These problems when combined with the lack of democratic
opposition and discriminatory policies may form a ripe environment for the radical
political Islam223 in the Caspian region. With their compounded problems, these
countries' adaptation to western standards might take longer. There is even a possibility
of rejecting these adaptations.
221 China's interests are mostly directed to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (in "Central Asia Shuns
U.S. hegemony"), but it is important to consider the different players' influence in the bigger picture by
paying more attention to bilateral relations between these countries. According to Stratfor, China even
advises the Kazak Army.
222 According to Paul Starobin, American Jewish groups like B'nai B'rith and the American
Jewish Congress seek to nourish the ancient Jewish communities in the Caspian towns including Baku,
Tashkent and Bukhara. Israel and American-Jewish groups also believe that there is a real chance, with the
right U.S. policy of fashioning a pan Turkic Central Asian belt that does not mistreat local Jews and is
friendly to Israel. In "The New Great Game." Although the Republic of Turkey does not seek or aim to
form any form of pan-Turkic alliance, an economic and cultural cooperation with these countries including
other non-Turkic states also helps similar objectives.
223 Radicalism is not a general trend in these countries, but examples of radical religious
opposition elsewhere in the world show that economic and social circumstances like these can end up
forming new threats in this region. The revival of Islam, which is already in progress in these countries, can
change and easily become a radical movement.
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Economically, the changing dynamics of energy industry can also decline both
countries' efficiency in regional politics. The merger of two oil companies, BP and
Amoco224 could further wither the abilities of U.S. decision-makers to influence regional
policies. Amoco was the major U.S. player in Azerbaijan. The merger of this company
into BP could increase British influence in the region where the United States defines its
interests as vital for the region.
Another economic aspect, low oil prices also effect Caspian politics by forcing the
oil industries to budget cutbacks. Because of these cutbacks, oil investors may firstly
refrain from new explorations. This trend directs them to more reliable resources with
fewer risks. Consequently if conditions worsen, many companies could choose to invest
in other areas rather than the Caspian region. As a result of this natural behavior, Caspian
countries may suffer economically. Similarly exploration of new oil supplies elsewhere
and the development of present reserves may divert the existing attention by interested
parties from the Caspian and may cause a loss of interest in the region. Furthermore the
region could be left to its destiny. Depending on other conditions, oil prices can fluctuate.
Sudden increases or decreases in the oil prices can have serious consequences for the
producers and consumers.225
If outside players still try to see the real circumstances through a liberal lens some
of the most important issues might be undermined.
The Allies' not so calculated policies might also hamper their mutual relations.
The contradictory U.S. policies in the Caucasus could injure its relationship with Turkey.
Turkey depends on Washington for assistance with regard to many common interests.
Weak support and tacit consent in the oil issues may create financial burdens for Ankara.
For this reason, Turkey may lose some of its incentives to work together in the Caucasus.
While the United States makes an advantageous economic decision, it may lose some of
its assets in its crucial strategic relationship with this country.
224 BP and Amoco announced a merger m August 1998.
225 According to Andrew Hamilton, oil prices are sensitive to small changes. An oversupply of less
than 3 percent of world oil demand can make prices fall and a small undersupply can cause prices to soar. In
"A Look at the Cost of Oil."
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If proper precautions are not taken, the congestion in the Turkish straits could
cause long waiting times. Because of the pollution and environmental damage, Turkey
might lose enormous amounts of money and if companies and states pressure Turkey for
unrestricted access, a diplomatic confrontation may take place between these countries.
Furthermore an accident could cause a disaster in Turkey's biggest metropolis.
Many of these projections might not happen at the same time or might not happen
at all. Considering the critical situation about Caspian pipelines, preparing for the worst
consequences and taking into account the stakes the U.S. and Turkey might face, may be
a good approach while formulating any new Caspian oil policies.
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VI. CONCLUSION
With its significant energy resources and promising economical opportunities the
Caspian region will continue to attract attention in the near future. But in order for
Caspian to be the next North Sea, existing policies should be revised and new policies
should be developed.
A. JUDGMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In order for this region's natural resources to be developed successfully some of
the main political and economic conditions must be met. Political stability, cost-effective
lines of transport and a positive financial and investment climate226 are core issues.
Obviously, without the first and the last conditions, second condition means little.
Financial institutions offer cost-effective transportation opportunities, yet the region is
still politically unstable and as a consequence of this instability, investment climate is
troubled. For the same reason, the decision in routing the pipelines should not rest only
on commercial and financial issues but should also include regional politics.
The United States should play its role in the region as dictated by the New World
Order. "The popular impression that the end of the Cold War has removed the need for
U.S. leadership in [this] strategic [zone] is dangerously wrong."227 Because of the
region's volatility, currently this presence is needed much more than elsewhere.228 With
226 Robert M. Cutler, "Towards Cooperative Energy Security in the South Caucasus," Caucasian
Regional Studies (Canada), No.l, (1996) [journal on-line]; available from; http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/crs/
eng/01 01-05.htm; Internet; accessed 7 February 2000.
227 William E. Odom, "U.S. Policy toward Central Asia and the South Caucasus."
228 According to Sherle R. Schwenninger "The Unipolar conditions of the post-Cold War world
were uniquely ideal for the United States to adopt a posture of benevolent and purposeful hegemony." "It
would be purposeful in the sense that Washington would have the conscious goal of building longer term
institutional and alliance arrangements favorable to its interests that would outlast American dominance,
which would inevitably weaken again over time." This can also be an argument on behalf of greater
American and regional interests. Sherle R. Schwenninger, "World Order Lost: American Foreign Policy in
the Post-Cold War World," World Policy Journal, Vol.16, No.2, (summer 1999): 42-71 [on-line]; available
from ABI Information Services (NPS domain) http://proquest.umi.com; accessed 27 November 1999.
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the proper policies, the U.S. presence in the region should block Russian neo-imperialism
and avoid the Russian monopoly over the proposed pipelines. Financial opportunities are
strongly related to construction of a competitive market in this region. Transportation of
oil is not only related to pipelines, for that reason a regional export system should be
established to permit pipeline investments.
Regional cooperation cannot be forced externally, but the outside world can and
should play an important role in supporting different opportunities. The preserving the
regional countries' independence and sovereignty must be the first priority. "Constant
political vigilance and monitoring by the OSCE and the West is needed to prevent
Moscow from adopting unilateral policies. If Western Europe and America refrain from
challenging Russia on its internal and Caspian policies, it creates the impression that
Russia has privileged status on violations of human rights and the use of force in the
internal disputes."229
The United States and Turkey should evaluate this subject more carefully giving
more emphasis to the pipeline politics. By this way they might have the chance to bargain
for strategic nuclear balance, proliferation and oil issues on different tables. Pipeline
issues need to be considered among the regional security issues.
Turkey and the United States should openly oppose Moscow's territorial claims
that could interfere with the economic and security interests of these countries. Both
countries need to reaffirm their commitment to good relations and peaceful coexistence in
the region, but they also need to ensure that these relations are based on equal conditions
of normal international relations. The new U.S. and Turkish Presidents should
communicate with their Russian counterpart to make sure Russian assertiveness does not
further destabilize region. Both countries should use their trade and aid agreements with
Russia as a counterbalance to Russian support for conflicting struggles.
They also need to internationalize the conflicts in the region. A dialog about the
future of the region and the solution of the problems must be started with the EU
!9 Craig R. Whitney, "Why Europe is Careful Not to Scold the Bear," New York Times, 2 January
1995, A6. Quoted in Stephen Blank, "Russia, the OSCE and Security in the Caucasus."
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countries. In this way, both fighting factions and the forces behind the policies might have
less of a chance to effect pipeline policies unilaterally. This could be another opportunity
to reduce the differences between European and American views. The OSCE and even
the NATO Partnership Council can be good environments to discuss the future of these
countries.
Turkish and American decision-makers need to communicate with the Russian
decision-makers more closely to prevent misunderstandings. In order to deter any rouge
movements, suitable military links and security agreements should be made with the
regional countries. There is also a need to deploy some kind of international military
presence in the region.230 This would prevent the spillover of the conflict to neighboring
countries.
The United States and Turkey should accelerate their efforts to construct the
Baku-Ceyhan pipeline before it becomes economically more vulnerable because of the
competition.
The United States and Turkey should also realize that the countries of the Caspian
and Caucasus are not less important than any other country in the world. They also need
to consider that these countries are no longer a part of the Russian Federation. Decision-
makers elsewhere need to take the subject as a whole including these issues.
The United States and Turkey should work closer to understand each other better.
They also need to minimize the differences in their cooperation by defining specific
features of their state interests. A specific goal and a mobilization of efforts might
compensate the time lost without significant gains.
United States and Turkey's financial aid with the investment activities must be
directed to this region. If possible, export-import regulations should be eased to activate
economical development. Coordination between government offices should be based on a
schedule for effective cooperation.
Financial problems can only be overcome when governments contribute to
investment costs. Coordination between governments and oil companies should be
230 Currently only outside military presence in the region belongs to Russia.
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increased so that oil companies understand the risks involved. The United States and
Turkish governments should offer tax reduction or exemptions for the companies that
invest in the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. If needed, legal amendments must be made and
favored investor status must be given to promote the developing of pipelines. The Turkish
government should continue its efforts through state-owned BOTAS and other state
conglomerates. If needed more attractive deals must be offered through these companies.
Strategists claim that a sound American National Energy Strategy is not built on
more regulations. A sound policy rather should remove impediments to the energy
market, eliminate barriers to energy production and facilitate innovation. 231 For that
reason the U.S. policy makers should take necessary measures for possible restrictions
caused or regulated by third parties.
According to some analysts, U.S. policy has devoted too little attention to
Turkey's importance in the region.232 Informing congress via the State Department and
the NSC could make it easier for politicians to understand the importance of Turkey in
U.S. foreign policy.
The U.S. policy-makers should revise their policy of investing in the Balkans and
enlarging Baku-Supsa pipeline. Because these pipelines probably will reduce the chance
of Clinton administration's declared Baku-Ceyhan support.
The United States should change its position in the Armenian-Azeri conflict. A
balanced approach with a neutral attitude may help both U.S. interest and regional
stability. In line with this approach, the U.S. should use all possible means to remove the
sanctions imposed on Azerbaijan since 1992.
U.S. security assistance should be expanded to these countries. High level
delegations should be exchanged for fact-finding and economic opportunities. This could
entail military and diplomatic education in the United States with technical and supply
assistance in excess military material.
231 Milton R. Copulos, "Securing America's Energy Future: A Primer on the National Energy
Strategy," The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 846, (9 August 1991) [on-line]; available from
http://www.heritage.org/library/categories/enviro/bg846.htrnl; Internet; accessed 31 January 2000.
232 William E. Odom.
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In order for Turkey to change the negative thinking in U.S. policy circules, Turkey
should launch an effective lobbying campaign in the United States and major European
countries about the importance and viability of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. Cooperating
with American Jews, Turkish Americans and the large number of Turks living in Europe
can be helpful to counter the problems caused by pro-Greek, pro-Armenian, pro-Kurdish
lobbies in Western security planners' calculations.
In order to prevent the rise of radical Islam, the international community should
grant support for secular Turkish State Model. Cooperating closer with Turkey on these
issues could benefit both regional governments and Turkey.
Turkey should use the BSEC and OSCE to initiate policies that would enhance
regional stability and economic cooperation in the region. Turkey should also bargain
with Armenia and try to prevent Armenia to fall further into extremist isolation.
Turkey should pay as much attention to the Caspian issues as it paid to European
affairs. It also needs to see this region as the EU's potential border. It should mobilize as
many supporters as possible to the Ankara's Caucasus pact and must be the initiator of
peaceful activities. It also needs to develop a continuous Caspian and Caucasus policy
entailed to a broader Central Asia scheme. Longer periods for governments in Turkey's
political life will definitely effect its foreign policy efficiency positively.
Turkey should develop closer relations with regional countries in educational,
economic and political issues. Turkey should also continue to contain the terrorism
problem in order to maintain suitable investment environment.
The United States and Turkey have already lost some of their assets owing to their
policies in the region. It is hoped that with the required modifications a new phase for
common interests could be realized.
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B. FOR BETTER REGIONAL POLICIES
The rush for oil and its benefits started decades ago. Many wars were fought for
its strategic importance in economical and military means. The idea of energy security
was born and flourished in this ground. During this time, the importance of politics in
energy policies decreased but did not fade. Oil politics were an important issue two
decades ago. Today this issue is different from previous decades but it still enriches
countries when it is used suitably and harms the others when its consequences are not
calculated. The Caspian region is a place where both consequences are vividly seen.
Although almost a decade has passed after Caspian littorals' independence, the
situation in the Caspian has not changed much. With their many regional and external
players, countries began to earn hard currencies, but they first need to pay the investment
costs back in terms of their natural resources. Before they prosper, investors must make
some money and guarantee their unexpected costs. In order for countries to bargain
equally with other players, they need to eliminate the burden of separatist struggles. They
also need to counter the moves made by the regional hegemonies. In order to be sovereign
states, they need to gain the support of their own citizens, cooperate with their neighbors
and adapt to the modern world. They at least must have a belief in their states' future. In
order for all this to occur, they must started initiatives that will help them. But they are
still struggling with the same problems they dealt in the early 1990's. They are still poor,
weak and in need of outside help. The west entered the area at the end of 1980's even
before their independence. Financial institutions and investors were the first ones to run
to the area. The United States and Turkey also became involved in Caspian politics for
different reasons. Although regional conditions improved slightly, the entrance of those
many players did not solve the major problems.
Players sought different methods in the region. European countries perceived the
region economically. Turkey wanted to see these countries free from any power's
dominance. The United States, on the other hand, was caught between its political
objectives and its economic priorities. With their continuing efforts Russia and Iran are
increasing mutual interests. Pipelines are being laid according to their preferences and
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regional agreements are being signed with the Caspian littorals. The Russian military is
moving southward openly threatening Azerbaijan while pounding Chechenya. It is also
stationing troops as peacekeepers in Armenia and Nagoma-Karabakh. Sanctions are in
place and pipeline decisions are waiting on the Azeri side. The situation in Georgia has
not changed greatly. After three assassination attempts, Georgia's president is still
battling Russian pressure. Investors do not care much about such situations as long as
they get their money and oil revenues. Countries far from the area do not have stakes in
the region. Some countries see benefits in challenging Russia while others pursue loftier
interests, but they do not pay enough attention to one point. "The faith of Georgia,
Armenia and Azerbaijan is inseparable from the success or failure of developing this
broader region both economically and politically and ensuring its stability. The current
turmoil in the south Caucasus will be remembered with fond nostalgia if policy makers
do not address wholly predictable demographic and geographic sources of a forthcoming
conflict."233 The situations of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan are similar and they are
prone to the same consequences.
Like other players of this oil game, the United States and Turkey are risking their
higher interests by failing to produce effective policies. They have already been caught
unprepared and slow to adapt to the frequently changing regional politics. If their
objectives are not achieved many issues from divergence of oil resources, to the value of
freedom and sovereignty of the new states will be undermined. All these problems
compound with the hardships faced while predicting the future developments. A lack of
concern and knowledge direct policy-makers to different objectives. This situation not
only enhances the possibility of facing unpredictable situations but also weakens the
future of subject countries, pipelines and oil policies. Without a revision in policies and a
consciousness about the dangers inherent in the future of regional countries, it is
impossible to produce effective and reliable policies in the region. After a decade of
experiences, the United States and Turkey must accelerate their commitments to
necessary changes. Their combined effort helps regional and global security. This
233 Robert M.Cutler, "Toward Cooperative Energy Security in the South Caucasus.'
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cooperation could economically be costly in the beginning but will probably create
positive investment environments in the future. The cooperation between the U.S. and
Turkey could also save much money by preventing a devastating dispute.
The United States and Turkey's only economic considerations do not give
desirable results in a region which mostly political activities dominate international
relations. A more policy-oriented approached built on a desirable economical formula can
help realize the security of all parties. Contrary to unilateral arguments this positive
environment meets the needs of all regional players, including Russia and Iran. In order to
have free-trade, the partners should have equal opportunities in the game. Enhancing the
security, economy and sovereignty of the region's weak states supplies the necessary
conditions for a free trade among equal partners. Without this structure all other
initiatives including the existing ones face the serious possibility of unpredictable failure.
Financial institutions and investors may not lose too much from this situation but regional
countries could lose years of their futures and global energy security might be effected as
a consequence.
Competition for the main oil pipelines is continuing today. It is still not definite
where the main oil pipelines will pass. The political and economical environment is
changing so fast that predicting the future of developments in the region is difficult. Just
like the changes in the last ten years, the years ahead are prone to new policies,
opportunities and new risks. The United States and Turkey cannot change the course of
world politics. They may not even be able to change the course of regional politics in the
Caspian region. They may, however, define their interests with a new outlook, calculate
the outcome of their policies and pursue more attainable future goals. They may solve
their intrinsic problems in policy-making and generate more productive outcomes.
Because a realistic assessment shows that promoting the security of this region will also
benefit the world at large more effective policies even if they do not succeed would
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